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During the last decade, there has been a remarkable increase in attention paid to 
multinational military forces. The idea of UN standing multinational maritime forces has 
emerged as a potentially important contributor to international peace, order and stability. The 
assignment of national contingents to such a force on a standing basis seems desirable, but 
so far there has been no international consensus on the establishment such as this force. 
This thesis proposes that a UN Standing Multinational Maritime Force can be an 
important contributor to international security. Establishing a UN Standing Multinational 
Maritime Force raises a central question: is it possible to establish a UN standing 
multinational maritime force? What are the problems and constraints of such force in the UN 
context? 
The point of this thesis is that there is a dilemma between realities and ideals, so that 
the establishment of a UN Standing Multinational Maritime Force seems to be a dream 
foreseeable only in the distant future. This thesis highlights the political constraints and 
problems that complicate the creation of a standing multinational maritime force in terms of 
UN naval missions and supporting tasks. Consequently, this thesis attempts to demonstrate 
that to establish a standing multinational maritime force within the UN organization is 
impossible unless these constraints and problems are solved. 
v 
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During the last decade, there has been a remarkable increase in attention paid to 
multinational military forces. The idea of UN standing multinational maritime forces has 
emerged as a potentially important contributor to international peace, order and security. The 
assignment of national contingents to such a force on a standing basis seems desirable, but 
so far there has been no international consensus on the establishment such as this force. 
This thesis proposes that a UN Standing Multinational Maritime Force can be an 
important contributor to international security. Establishing a UN Standing Multinational 
Maritime Force raises a central question: is it possible to establish a UN standing 
multinational maritime force? What are the problems and constraints of such a force in the 
UN context? 
The point of this thesis is that there is a dilemma between realities and ideals, so that 
the establishment of a UN Standing Multinational Maritime Force seems to be a dream 
foreseeable only in the distant future. This thesis highlights the political constraints and 
problems that complicate the creation of a standing multinational maritime force in terms of 
UN naval missions and supporting tasks. Consequently, this thesis attempts to demonstrate 
that to establish a standing multinational maritime force within the UN organization is 
impossible unless these constraints and problems are solved. 
In terms of the collective maritime security, creation of a conceptual basis has vital 
importance for the creation of a UN standing multinational maritime force. It is impossible 
to establish such a standing maritime force before defining its possible missions and the 
limitations ofthese missions. In the second chapter, this thesis focuses on the possible UN 
maritime missions, multinational maritime force structures, management choices for 
multinational maritime forces and necessity of UN standing maritime force and its benefits. 
The opinions expressed in this chapter are not necessarily official and may not be the best 
but they help us imagine the dimensions of UN maritime operations in which a standing 
multinational maritime force will fulfill its missions. 
xi 
The establishment of a UN standing maritime force faces these main political 
problems which have been driven from the conflict between civilizations, the notion of 
nation-state, major power interests, differences in the use of force perceptions and NATO 
expansion. These roots of the existing political problems still continue and as a result of 
these situation, political support - and consequently political consensus - for collective 
security cited in the UN Charter has never been concluded. Notwithstanding the Western 
countries display their willingness for international maritime cooperation, a continuous and 
sufficient framework accepted by the world community has not been formed because of the 
absence of the political consensus. 
The world is now living in a period of history that can be defined as a transition to 
a new world order. There are new players, new capabilities, new alignments, and new threats, 
but so far, no new rules. Consequently, the situation of uncertainty affects the international 
affairs. Under this conditions, the solution of existing political problems would not be 
achieved in the foreseeable future. As a historical evident, the creation of such a force within 
the UN organization seem to be impossible unless these problems are solved. As a result of 
this picture, the establishment of a UN standing maritime force seems to be a dream 
foreseeable only in the distant future. 
This thesis states that the solution of existing political problems will not be achieved 
in the foreseeable future, but they are not unsolvable. Most of them are time-dependant 
problems, such as the conflict between civilizations, and differences in the concept of the use 
of force. Most likely, these problems will be automatically solved in the course oftime. 
Indeed, it is implausible to wait for the solutions. The world community must do 
something rather than waiting until the humankind has suffered. In order to reduce the 
amount of unpleasant events or suffering conflicts, the solutions of problems may be 
quickened by the international or regional organizations, and major powers. 
The previous analysis of the possible UN maritime missions and multinational 
maritime force structures, and political problems that complicate the creation of a UN 
standing maritime force lead to nine recommendations. They present choices for decision 




During the last decade, there has been a remarkable increase in attention paid to 
multinational military forces because of more frequent demands for the services of the 
United Nations (UN). Injust six years, 1988-1993, the United Nations created eighteen new 
peacekeeping operations, compared with a total of thirteen in its first forty-three years. Five 
peacekeeping operations were established during 1988 and 1989 alone, and, in 1991 and 
1992, the UN Security Council created another nine operations. In October 1993, there were 
seventeen active UN missions, compared to only five in 1987.1 Sixteen remained active in 
the summer of 1996.2 It is quite clear that the United Nations has and will probably continue 
to have an increasing role in security issues. 
As it is well known, collective security requires an organized, multi functional, and 
multinational response, including military forces and their usage, from the international 
community. Consequently, it is possible to say that if the UN is to become the effective 
mechanism for enhancing international security, the organization must be able to deploy 
military forces whenever and wherever they are required. In this sense, the increasing role 
of the UN in international security has shifted the focus of attention to a specific and 
complex problem. The problem is which kind of forces should be used, by whom and in what 
circumstances. 
Despite the renewed interest in the United Nations, very little international attention 
has been devoted to UN naval cooperation issues. Most of the current proposals for 
multinational forces, in fact, exclude consideration of naval forces, except perhaps the need 
for sealift. Yet, most of the UN operations recently authorized have had naval components 
1 Janet E. Heininger, Peacekeeping in Transition: The United States in Cambodia, New 
York: The Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1994, p. 3 
2 
"Peace Operations and Humanitarian Support," in Strategic Assessment 1996, 
Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1996. p. 132, 133. 
of some kind. Furthermore, the areas in which expansion of UN involvement is possible, 
such as international enforcement of UN agreements (for example, the third UN Convention 
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III)), may be particularly suited for a maritime context. 
Hence, it is important to consider the role of the United Nations in facilitating, sponsoring, 
coordinating, or executing multinational cooperation on the seas. 3 
In addition to the traditional maritime peacekeeping and enforcement operations, other 
areas of maritime activities are increasingly important, and the UN may be the appropriate 
institutional mechanism for naval cooperation to treat problems in a timely and consistent 
manner. Such problem areas include piracy, terrorism, and drug smuggling, ecological 
operations involving maritime oil production and shipping, pollution from both fresh water 
sources and ocean dumping, fisheries disputes, and the monitoring of ocean temperature, 
salinity, acidity, and carbon dioxide content. A properly established and equipped UN 
maritime force may be the solution to cope with such issues. More generally, many nations 
recognize the importance of common maritime security embracing environmental, social and 
economic factors as well as the more traditional naval elements.4 The United Nations has 
some notable advantages over regional organizations in tackling security problems: it is 
universal; it has a reputation, even if is now under threat, for impartiality; and it has a clearer 
set of arrangements for making decisions on security issues than do most regional 
organizations, including even the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NAT0).5 It does not 
mean that the United Nations has an appropriate mechanism in order to fulfill its 
responsibilities, but its Charter includes arrangements and procedures for decision-making 
and creating a compatible and divergent mechanism. 
4 
Jeffrey I. Sands, Blue Hulls: Multinational Naval Cooperation and the United 
Nations, Alexandria, VI: Center For Naval Analyses, CRM 93-40/July 1993, p. 1 
RobertS. Staley II, The Wave of Future, The United Nations and Naval 
Peacekeeping, Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner Publishers, Inc. 1992, pp. 19,20. 
5 Adam Roberts, "The United Nations and International Security," London: Survival 
vol. 35, no. 2, Summer 1993, p. 7. 
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In order to promote and support international peace, order and stability, the idea of UN 
Standing Multinational Military Forces has emerged as an important possible contributor to 
these aims. Its advocates, for example Sir Brian Urquhart point out that the response from 
governments to the Charter idea of rapid deployment standby units has so far been at best 
non-committal, and that present signs are not encouraging.6 He has long advocated the 
establishment of a small, standing, highly-trained volunteer rapid response group as part of 
the UN itself to fulfil an evident increased need for a flexible, rapid response capability, 
reliably and immediately available for UN service. 7 
More recently, Gwyn Prins, Director of Cambridge University's Global Security 
Program, has advocated the creation of a United Nations Standing Naval Force. Prins 
recognizes the need for the development of concomitant United Nations command and 
control systems and procedures, and specifically calls for the development of United Nations 
Standard Operating Procedures (UNSOPs). In addition, the Standing Naval Force he 
envisions would be augmented by nations and alliances during periods of international 
emergency. 8 
The idea of a UN Standing Multinational Maritime Force is still new a phenomenon 
and has vital importance. The assignment of national contingents on a standing basis seems 
a viable option, but so far there has been no international consensus on the establishment of 
such this force. 
6 
7 
Brian Urquhart, currently Scholar-in-Residence in the International Affairs Program 
at the Ford Foundation, was one of the first United Nations civil servants, and served 
in the United Nations Secretariat from 1945 until his retirement in 1986. He worked 
closely with all five Secretaries-General on peace and security matters, especially 
peacekeeping, and was Under Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs from 
1974 to 1986. 
David Ramsbotham, "The Changing Nature of Intervention- The Role of UN 
Peacekeeping," London: Conflict Studies #282, August 1995, p. 14. 
Staley, p. 30. 
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B. PURPOSE 
This thesis argues that a UN Standing Maritime Force (UNSTANMARFOR) can be 
an important contributor to international security. The creation of a UNST ANMARFOR begs 
a central question: is it possible to establish a UNSTANMARFOR in the foreseeable future? 
What are the problems and constraints of such force in the UN context? 
The point of this thesis is that there is a dilemma between realities and ideals, so that 
the establishment of a UNST ANMARFOR seems to be a dream foreseeable only in the 
distant future. This thesis highlights the political constraints or problems that the creation of 
a standing multinational maritime force in terms of UN naval missions and supporting tasks. 
Consequently, this thesis attempts to demonstrate that to establish a standing multinational 
maritime force within the UN organization is impossible unless these constraints and 
problems are solved. 
C. DEFINITIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS 
It is important to clarify some terms and assumptions used in this thesis. The 
definitions that follow are not necessary official, but are the ones that best delineate the issue. 
The opinions expressed are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect the 
position of the Turkish Navy or the Ministry of National Defense of Turkish Republic. 
Quite simply, the UN exists to enhance international security. Its Charter is the source 
of its authority in meeting this responsibility; the Charter is oriented wholly to maintaining 
or restoring international security or to removing the root causes of instability. The UN itself 
is neither an independent international entity nor a supranational authority, but a collection 
of sovereign states that have vested the organization with their authority. Their instrument 
for doing so is the Charter, which is both a treaty and a constitution that guides, and in some 
cases, compels the actions of the member states and the United Nations itself.9 This thesis 
assumes that the members of the UN all acknowledge and accept the UN Charter. 
9 John N. Petrie, "Myths and Misconceptions about the United Nations," Newport: 
Naval War College Review, vol. XLIX, no. 1, Sequence 353, Winter 1996, pp. 75,76. 
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An Agenda for Peace recognizes that the sovereign state is still the fundamental unit 
in the international system. 10 In addition to this recognition, this thesis assumes that the 
major powers, including the permanent members of the UN Security Council, naturally play 
a great role or have a great influence in the decision making process within the UN and 
international affairs in general. At this point, it is necessary to clarify what is meant by the 
"major powers". Major Powers are sovereign states which are able, individually or by virtue 
of their strategic positions in powerful international or regional organizations, to affect 
international political outcomes regularly and substantially. 11 
In order to maintain international peace and security, the Purposes and Principles of 
the UN appear as Articles 1 and 2 in its Charter. In brief, the Purposes are: maintenance of 
peace and security, including the prevention and removal of threats, suppression of acts of 
aggression, adjustment or settlement of international disputes, strengthening universal peace, 
and furthering international cooperation. The Principles call for sovereign equality, fulfilling 
the obligations of membership, peaceful settlement of international disputes, refraining from 
the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity and political independence of states, 
cooperation with UN efforts for prevention and enforcement, the responsibility even of non-
members not to threaten the peace, and avoiding interference in the domestic matters of 
member states except when international peace and security are threatened or breached. 12 
In this sense, this thesis assumes that the term 'collective security' refers to a system 
in which each state in the system agrees that the protection and application of the Purposes 
and Principles of the UN is the concern of all and agrees to join in a collective response to 
any who denies or deviates from these purposes and principles. Collective security rests on 
10 Boutros B. Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, New York: United Nations Publication, 
1995. 
11 The core idea of the definition of 'major power' is inspired from the definition of 
'elites' defined by Richard Gunther in Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin 
America and Southern Europe, London, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 9. 
12 Petrie, p. 75. 
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the asswnption of all against one; it is a set of commitments and institutions that ensures that 
aggression by any state vvill automatically be met vvith the combined power of the rest of the 
world to repulse that aggression and restore the status quo ante. Without doubt, such a 
collective security requires, above all, that the major powers agree on a status quo. 
The original intention of the United Nations was to maintain or restore international 
peace, if necessary through demonstrations, blockades, and other operations by air, sea, or 
land forces. 13 Article 1 of the Charter has it that the first purpose of the UN is the 
maintenance of international peace and security. There are concrete measures set out in the 
Charter to ensure this, both in Chapter VI, which talks about the 'pacific settlement of 
disputes' -finding solutions by negotiation, conciliation, mediation, and other peaceful 
means- and in Chapter VII, which provides for enforcement measures in case of threats to 
international peace and security. But 'peacekeeping' is not mentioned in either chapter. 14 In 
this thesis, it is asswned that the use of force can be applied only under the Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter. Consequently, traditional peacekeeping operations vvill not involve the 
possible UN naval missions mentioned in the second chapter of this thesis. In Chapter II, 
traditional peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations have been interpreted a 
suppressive peace operation as a combined form of them. 
Multinational military, including naval forces may be organized for a collective 
purpose according to three different schemes: ad hoc, on-call, and standing forces. The 
differences between the three are explained later in this thesis. 
One can conclude that the views delineated in this thesis are very optimistic. On 
this issue, one must think simply and plainly. We are living in this world and have no chance 
to escape from this environment. There is no another world. There are important security 
problems to be solved. There is nobody to solve those problems except us. In order to 
enhance international peace and stability, the UN was established and is maintained it for this 
13 Michael C. Pugh, "Multinational Naval Operation," Proceedings, March 1994, p. 72. 
14 Shashi Tharoor, "Peace-Keeping: Principles, Problems, Prospects," Naval War 
College Review, vol. XLVII, no. 2, Sequence 346, Spring 1994, p. 10. 
6 




II. POSSIBLE UN MARITIME MISSIONS AND MULTINATIONAL MARITIME 
FORCE STRUCTURES 
A. OVERVIEW 
The end of the Cold War has offered the world an opportunity for more effective 
cooperation to prevent or halt deadly conflicts, and to promote economic and social welfare. 
In our world, 70 percent of which is covered by the sea, the necessity of multinational 
maritime cooperation has been noticed since before the end of the Cold War. For example, 
the following extracts from a UN study are a clear sign of the need for multinational 
maritime cooperation. 
With greater interest in the exploitation of marine resources and the introduction 
of the exclusive economic zone, the number of offshore and other commercial 
activities will continue to increase ... [and] the growing complexity of offshore 
activities will call for much improved national and international management 
arrangements if marine resources are to be exploited in a rational and orderly 
manner to the benefit of mankind .... New resources, new developments, new 
responsibilities - all will demand more coordinated maritime policies, 
administrative machinery, and policing capabilities. 
Within this growing range of activities, there is much that appropriately 
equipped naval vessels could do. There are also many ways in which the greater 
experience and capacities of the maritime powers that a present have worldwide 
and blue-water navies could assist coastal states, if so requested and without 
interfering in their affairs, in dealing with this entirely new range of problems. 
This UN study was commissioned by the UN General Assembly at the initiative of 
Sweden in 1985.15 
With the end of the Cold War, earlier in December 1991, a conference called 
"Multinational Naval Cooperation in a Changing World" was held at the Royal Naval 
15 Derek Boothby, "Sailing Under New Colors," Proceedings, Naval Institute Press, vol. 
1181711073, July 1992, p. 50. 
9 
--- -------~---------------------------------------
College at Greenwich, London. It was attended by about 80 senior and middle-level naval 
officers, politicians, and academics -mostly from industrialized countries. All the major 
maritime states except China were represented. 16 All these developments show that the 
Western powers are ready to at least contemplate cooperation in maritime activities seriously. 
In addition to the international peace and security requirements, the impact of 
increasingly intensive use of the seas, pressures on the ecological balance, and humanitarian 
issues has compelled and still compels the nations to cooperate with each other, and 
collectively, regulate and govern the maritime activities. 
In the wider world, the United Nations is now assuming a higher profile. The change 
in superpower relations has allowed for the United Nations to become increasingly active in 
international and interregional issues. The potential emergence of a multinational security 
mechanism in the UN Security Council may raise the expectations that the UN may become 
an appropriate institutional mechanism for the maritime cooperation to treat possible 
problems in a timely and consistent manner. 
On the other hand, according to Ginifer, an adequate conceptual basis has yet to be 
established for United Nations maritime peace and security initiatives. He goes on to explain 
that there is a need for a rigorous conceptual framework appropriate to the changing context 
of the post-Cold War world. Moves within the UN towards a more 'interventionist' approach 
suggest an increased role for naval forces, since they have the capacity to circumvent issues 
of sovereignty and consent as well as to project force. However, unless a coherent naval 
conceptual framework is articulated, the UN will not be in a position to effectively manage 
naval peace and security issues. 17 
Analysts such as Peter Haydon have argued the similar conclusion that the requirement 
is for the introduction of a doctrinal and procedural framework for multinational naval 
16 Ibid., p. 48. 
17 Jeremy Ginifer, "A Conceptual Framework for UN Naval Operations," in Maritime 
Security and Peacekeeping by Michael Pugh, New York: Manchester University 
Press, 1994, p. 55. 
10 
operations that can form the point of departure when planning such operations outside the 
NATO/WEU system. 18 
In terms of the collective maritime security, creation of a conceptual basis has vital 
importance for the creation of a UN standing multinational maritime force. It is impossible 
to establish such a standing maritime force before defming its possible missions and the 
limitations of these missions. This chapter focuses on the possible UN maritime missions and 
multinational maritime force structures. The opinions expressed below are not necessarily 
official and may not be the best but they help to imagine the dimension of UN maritime 
operations in which standing multinational maritime force will fulfill its missions. 
B. POSSIBLE UN NAVAL MISSIONS AND SUPPORTING TASKS 
1. Peace and Security Operations 
The types of operations described below are established by the UN Security Council 
under the UN Charter Chapter VI and VII, and directed by the Secretary-General. The use 
of force or the non-use of force and the force size if it is to be used, depend on Security 
Council decisions according to its evaluation of existing conflict or of potential conflict. If 
the Security Council has some hesitations about the fulfillment of Chapter VI, it may make 
its decisions under Chapter VII. In this sense, the force structure and the dimension and 
limitations of any peace and security operation are defined by the Security Council but not 
with the consent of disputing parties. Undoubtedly, the consent of disputing parties plays a 
great role on the Security Council decision, but it is not sufficient. 
a. Preventive Operation 
A preventive operation is a military activity drawn from 'preventive diplomacy' 
and 'peace-building'. In this sense, a preventive operation may be applied as a pre-conflict 
or post-conflict military measure. Preventive Diplomacy is an act to prevent disputes from 
18 Peter T. Haydon, Ann L. Griffiths, Multinational Naval Forces, Halifax, Nova Scotia, 
Canada: Dalhousie University Center for Foreign Policy Studies Press, 1995, p. 30. 
11 
developing between parties, prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to 
limit the spread of the latter when they occur. 19 
Peace-building is critical in the aftermath of conflict. Peace-building includes the 
identification and support of measures and structures which will promote peace and build 
trust and interaction among former enemies, in order to avoid relapse into conflict2° 
An Agenda for Peace points out that the most desirable and efficient employment 
of diplomacy is to ease tensions before they result in conflict - or, if conflict breaks out, to 
act swiftly to contain it and resolve its underlying causes. Preventive diplomacy requires 
measures to create confidence. It needs early warning based on information gathering and 
informal or formal fact-finding. It may also involve preventive deployment and, in some 
situations, demilitarized zones.21 
The purpose of preventive operations is to show an action to deter hostilities, 
rather than wait until after armed conflict occurs. Preventive operations send two clear 
messages to the sovereign states. First, that international disputes or internal conflicts of any 
nation, which threaten to international peace and security, are observed by the UN. Second, 
that the UN will not allow any disputing party to deny the UN Charter Chapter VI in order 
to solve the conflict. 
Preventive Operations include following missions: 
(1) Preventive Deployment. The purpose of preventive deployment is to 
send the forces to an area to deter hostilities, rather than waiting until after armed conflict 
between states or an internal conflict in a state occurs. 22 If applied to naval forces, forward 
19 United Nations Military Observers Handbook, New York, NY: United Nations 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations Publication, 1995, p. 5. 
20 Ibid., p. 5. 
21 Ghali, p. 47. 
22 In fact, this mission was drawn, in part, from "Basic Facts About the United Nations" 
as a United Nations Department ofPublic Information Publication, New York, NY: 
1995, p. 29. 
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deployment to gather information through surveillance and other techniques might be 
regarded as a useful approach, not only in responding to traditional military threats to 
international peace and security, but also with respect to population migrations and 
environmental damage through accidents and natural disasters. 23 
The presence of UN naval forces can avert confrontation and support UN 
aims without necessarily violating national sovereignty. UN diplomatic efforts can be 
strengthened by naval forces 'showing the flag' in a benign fashion as a general indicator of 
UN interest and latent capabilities, thereby helping to stop emerging conflicts among states.24 
In this respect, the forward deployment of a UN maritime force may project 
a diplomatic signal in terms of the fulfillment of Chapter VI. In order to minimize the 
possibility of the use of force, UN naval presence may be the best way to contribute to the 
enhancing international peace and security. 
(2) Establishment of Demilitarized Zones. The purpose of the 
establishment of a demilitarized zone is to define geographic areas at sea in where some form 
of arms limitation or reduction are determined by the Security Council. In this mission, 
maritime force's role is to observe and control this area. 
The concept of a maritime demilitarized zone established in advance of a 
conflict, rather than following it, is a confidence-and-security building measure that might 
be advanced.25 
b. Suppressive Peace Operations 
A suppressive peace operation combines traditional peacekeeping and peace 
enforcement. The purpose of this operation is to maintain or restore international peace and 
security by the use of force. In order to achieve this end, the main objective of the operation 
is to persuade aggressor states to stop their violations. 
23 Ginifer, p 63,64. 
24 Sands, p. 21. 
25 Ginifer, p. 64. 
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The objectives of peace operations generally include neither victory, in the 
ordinary sense of defeating a defined enemy militarily, nor the identification of an enemy. 
The equivalent of victory is successful implementation of a mandate-maintaining the 
political-military status quo, for example, or facilitating implementation of a peace accord. 
The latter mission may entail the temporary maintenance of civic order.26 
In this mission, the tasks for the UN naval force may include: 
(1) Supporting Land-Based Operations. The purpose of the supporting 
land-based operation is to provide sealift, command, control, communication and 
intelligence, medical and evacuation facilities to a UN land-based military forces. 
Naval forces can provide sealift to UN land-based operations in terms of 
personnel and equipment. Naval forces can also provide seaborne Command, Control, 
Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C41) to land-based operations, and integral 
search and rescue and reserve capability.27 
Although sealift was superseded by airlift for the small peacekeeping 
operations during the Cold War, large-scale operations on land are more likely to require 
logistic support by sea which might be need to be guarded by naval units. In addition, 
whatever the size of the operation, offshore helicopter support, and medical and evacuation 
facilities may prove vital.28 
(2) Peace Enforcement. Peace enforcement operations are a form of 
suppressive peace operations including no limitations on the use of force. Peace-enforcement 
may be needed when all other efforts fail. The authority for enforcement is provided by 
Chapter VII of the Charter, and includes the use of armed force to maintain or restore 
26 Antonia Chayes, George Raach, Peace Operations: Developing an American 
Strategy, Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1995, p. 24. 
27 Sands, p.14. 
28 Michael Pugh, Maritime Security and Peacekeeping, New York: Manchester 
University Press, 1994, p. 42. 
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international peace and security in situations in which the Security Council has determined 
the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression. 29 
Within the remit of enforcement actions naval forces are capable of 
independent force projection, ranging from tactical shore bombardment to strategic strikes 
against land assets. During the Persian Gulf War, SLCMs and other forms of precision-
guided munitions delivered by carrier-borne aircraft and naval vessels inflicted significant 
damage to the infrastructure ofiraq.30 
Naval forces may have a comparative advantage over land-based forces for 
UN-sponsored retaliatory strikes by aircraft or cruise missiles, since there would be a need 
for nearby land bases, occasionally requiring overflights or other violations of national 
sovereignty. On the other hand, when UN takes such action, sovereignty may less likely be 
a problem.31 
In this mission, the naval force's tasks are defined in accordance with 
Security Council resolutions related to the intervened conflict. In order to enforce such 
resolutions, naval tasks may include strike operations, local sea and air control, blockade and 
several combat operations. For example, the first task assigned the naval forces during the 
Gulf War (by Resolution 661/90) was to enforce economic sanctions imposed on Iraq by the 
Security Council. The participating navies operated collectively as a Maritime Interception 
Force (MIF). The MIF was a multinational maritime force-organized to intercept prohibited 
cargo on shipping bound for or leaving Iraqi and Kuwaiti ports.32 
When the military action began, the tasks of the international naval force 
increased. The Gulf Cooperation Council navies focused on patrolling their coastal waters 
29 United Nations Military Observers Handbook, p. 5. 
30 Ginifer, p. 70. 
31 Sands, p. 23. 
32 Juan Carlos Neves, "Interoperability in Multinational Coalitions: Lessons from the 
Persian GulfWar," Naval War College Review, vol. XLVIII, no. 1, Sequence 349, 




and protecting facilities near the shore from sea attacks. Surface combatants from Kuwait, 
Saudi Arabia, the UK, and the US joined in offensive anti-surface operations. Warships from 
Argentina, Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, and Spain 
provided protection to combat logistics forces. 33 
2. Non-Military Missions 
If one looks at post-Cold War security interests through a UN window, the view 
includes the general and broad goals, values, and principles which are the essence of civil 
and cooperative international society. It embraces the rule of law, nonaggression and the 
pacific settlement of disputes, respect for sovereignty, defense of rights and respect for 
humanitarian principles, control of arsenals, curbs on proliferation, and, in general, a 
disciplined, cooperative approach to common security and common prosperity. 
Consequently, the world community faces multiple responsibilities: humanitarian assistance, 
economic guidance and support, help for democratic institution-building, and aid in 
guaranteeing the security of nuclear weapons as well as ensuring the secure elimination of 
larger numbers ofthem.34 
Currently, low-intensity operations designed to protect maritime safety and manage 
ocean resources are perhaps the most acceptable to states for joint naval/coast guard forces. 
A whole range of ocean resource management and law-and-order problems are often beyond 
the jurisdiction or competence of individual states: mine clearing, disaster relief, marine 
pollution, transport and disposal of hazardous waste, interception of smuggling (whether 
animals, artifacts, or drugs), piracy (which has become particularly prevalent in the waters 
of Southeast Asia), and terrorism.35 
Non-military missions are drawn from the UN's responsibilities, such as humanitarian, 
economic and social, and legal issues. Any non-military mission can be applied at the request 
33 Ibid., p. 51. 
34 Thomas Pickering, "The UN Contribution to Future International Security," Naval 
War College Review, vol. XLVI, no. 1, Sequence 341, pp. 94-95. 
35 Pugh, p. 74. 
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or with the consent of the host nation, or as a collective measure against non-governmental 
group's activities such as terrorism, piracy, and narcotic trade. With the approval of the 
Security Council, military assets may be used in non-military missions proposed by the 
principal organs of the UN, for example, General Assembly and its main committees, 
Economic and Social Council, Trusteeship Council, and International Court of Justice. In 
non-military missions, the use of force can be applied under Chapter VII, Articles 39, 40, and 
41. 
a. Humanitarian Assistance 
Improving the speed and effectiveness of international humanitarian assistance 
and strengthening international capacities to prevent and cope with emergency situations are 
among the main responsibilities of the UN. Effective international assistance in response to 
major humanitarian emergencies requires planning, coordination, logistics, diplomacy and 
fund-raising. The UN plays a major role in all these fields, coordinated through the 
Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA). The Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian 
Affairs, who also serves as UN Emergency Relief Coordinator, is the UN system's principal 
policy advisor, coordinator and advocate on issues pertaining to humanitarian emergencies.36 
Maritime forces are well suited to support humanitarian aid efforts to relieve or 
reduce the suffering, loss of life, and damage to property caused by natural or man-made 
disasters. In particular, military forces are useful to provide a secure environment to allow 
the humanitarian relief efforts of other organizations to progress as directed by cognizant 
legal authority. Short notice readiness, flexibility and mobility allow maritime forces to 
respond quickly to a disaster. Maritime forces may provide personnel, equipment, supplies, 
medical and dental care, security, limited construction and engineering, communication and 
transportation support.37 
36 Basic Fact about the United Nations, p. 217. 
37 Multinational Maritime Operations, Department of the Navy, Naval Doctrine 
Command Publication, Norfolk, VA: 1995, p. 2-3/7 
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With the approval of the Security Council, naval forces can be assigned for 
humanitarian assistance missions, if the Secretary-General or Under-Secretary-General for 
DHA request military assets. Humanitarian Assistance missions may include the following: 
• Providing transportation humanitarian and relief personnel, and providing 
resupply for field personnel ashore. 
• Providing medical treatment and care, engineering equipment and other civilian 
welfare support. 
• Evacuation of Non-Combatants and Refugees. 
• Conducting search and rescue for refugees and UN field personnel in distress on 
land or at sea. 
• Monitoring refugee flows and provide humanitarian assistance at sea 
b. Economic and Social, Law and Order Missions 
When nations make claims over waters that are contested, challenges to freedom 
of navigation may arise. In such instances maritime forces can exercise freedom of 
navigation by traversing or exercising in the contested waters, in accordance with recognized 
international law. They may also protect merchant shipping that could otherwise be 
threatened. 38 
With the reemergence of piracy in littoral waters, terrorism on the high seas, and 
the drawdown of national naval forces, multinational naval presence and crisis response for 
the protection of economic resources and trade may become more important. This is true 
especially in the world's main navigational strait and passages, which are also its major trade 
routes. At times, multinational cooperation in this traditional naval mission area may include 
surveillance, mines weeping, and convoy and escort operations.39 
The development of international maritime law, especially the Third UN 
Convention ofthe Law of Sea (UNCLOS III), has established a legal environment in which 
the UN could take on a variety of new low-intensity policing functions in support of 
international agreements. This is especially important in areas of international straits because 
38 Multinational Maritime Operations, p. 2-4/7. 
39 Sands, p. 18. 
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attempts to police straits could lead to disputes, perhaps even conflicts. For many nations, 
this mission area could involve coast guards as well as civilian maritime agencies.40 
The prevention of global or major power conflict involving the use of weapons 
of mass destruction depends on the maintenance, strengthening and extension of the pattern 
of treaties, conventions and agreements which began with the Geneva protocol. In the 
nuclear field the 1995 review of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and negotiations 
towards a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) illustrate clearly the issues where 
perceived national interest and ideals of international security are difficult to reconcile.41 
The extension of arms control arrangements to new categories of weapons-
chemical and biological weapons-and the relatively cheap technology needed to produce 
them should be on the international agenda. The reinforcement of the UN Register of 
Conventional Arms which came into operation in 1993 is, the obvious priority for the 
purposes of peacekeeping. Defensive mechanisms against them are expensive, and yet 
another burden on contributing nations; military action to destroy or counter them will draw 
the UN nearer to being regarded as a protagonist by whichever country possesses them.42 
The proliferation of conventional, and especially high technology, weapons is an 
increasing threat to international security. The UN General Assembly has therefore 
established a voluntary registry for arms production and transfers to provide greater 
transparency which, it is hoped, can exert some moderating influence through mutual self-
restraint by the principal supplier countries. This is an area warranting a greater UN capacity 
for surveillance of international trouble spots and local arms race; but it must be omitted 
from the list of military enforcement possibilities, for the five permanent members of the 
Security Council are themselves the leading arms traffickers.43 
40 Ibid., p. 15. 
41 Ramsbotham, p. 15. 
42 Ibid.,p.l5. 
43 John Lee, Robert von Pagenhardt, and Timothy Stanley, To Unite Our Strength: 
Enhancing the United Nations Peace and Security System, Lanham, Maryland: 
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It certainly would be plausible for naval forces to be engaged directly in UN 
inspection, custody, and destruction of weapons at sea. This is especially true with respect 
to mine countermeasures, which are a concern for all UN efforts where seaborne delivery of 
aid, forces, or supplies is a possibility. Mine countermeasures are also important in the 
context of measures to protect sea and air traffic and to guarantee rights of passage. 44 
The prevention of the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons, and of 
nuclear weapons is on the international agenda. So far, the efforts related this issues have 
been waged in concert with active, but moderate diplomacy. The United Nations peace and 
security system may lead to widening activities in prevention of such proliferation in future. 
Moreover, these activities may take place in peace and security operations as enforcement 
actions in accordance with the consensus between major powers. Specific naval supporting 
tasks may include the following: 
• Enforcement of fisheries regulation and EEZ arrangements, 
• Operations against piracy, 
• Interdiction narcotics trade, transit, and smuggling, 
• Measures to protect the marine environment, 
• Interdiction arms smuggling, 
• Inspection and destruction of arms at sea, 
• Counterterrorism operations, and 
• Interdiction of the slave trade or illegal migration 
C. MULTINATIONAL MARITIME FORCE STRUCTURES 
In order to fulfill UN maritime missions mentioned above, there are three possible 
options for creating multinational maritime forces in the UN context. These options are Ad 
University Press of America, Inc., 1992, p. 19. 
44 Sands, p. 22. 
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Hoc Force, On-Call force, and Standing Force. The attributes of multinational maritime force 
structures have been well documented by Jeremy Ginifer. (see Table 1)45 
Table 1. Attributes of a Multinational Maritime Force* 
Ad hoc On-call Standing 
Interoperability Variable and Relatively high; likely to High, with training and 
unpredictable, dependent be prepared for exercising on a constant 
on combinations of collective action. basis. 
states involved. 
Readiness Low, except for national Ready for action High, but dependent on 
contingencies. relatively quickly. location. 
Integration of Highly variable. Likely to be high once Very high. 
command and control formed and worked up. 
National versus National commitment Usually engaged on Permanently dedicated 
multinational has overriding priority. national priorities; but to multinational tasks. 
commitment earmarked for 
multinational roles. 
Costs to states of Relatively cheap to Relatively low if dual Initially high to provide 
multinational divert assets temporarily functioning maximizes new multinational 
allocations from national functions; use of resources. structures; possible long-
but few long-term term savings. 
division-of-labor 
savings. 
Duration of Temporary. Permanent on a part- Permanent. 
commitment time basis. 
Flexibility High, can readily National roles Likely to preclude use 
undertake unilateral, potentially constrained for national purposes. 
bilateral and multilateral by multinational role. 
missions·. 
National control Complete, except when Diminished by Minimal or non-existent 
loss volunteered. commitment to for fully developed 
multinational duties at force. 
short notice. 
*This table is drawn from a study done by Jeremy Ginifer, "Multinational Naval Force Structure" in Maritime 
Security and Peacekeeping- A Framework for United Nations Operations by Michael Pugh, New York: 
Manchester University Press, 1994, p. 104. 
45 Ginifer, p. 104. 
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1. Ad Hoc Force 
An ad hoc force is mobilized with the emergence of a threat rather than in anticipation 
of it. This implies a low level of preparedness. Units remain under national command but 
once the force is constituted operational control is likely to be vested in a state or a group of 
states. The force is likely to be configured for short-term objectives and will usually be 
temporary in nature. Unless the units have a tradition of co-operation there will be a low 
level of interoperability: state military and political structures will prevail. A collective ad 
hoc arrangement can be defined as one in which multinational forces co-operate or co-
ordinate for a specific purpose; in which a significant measure of national control is retained; 
and in which no substantive form of multinational control, or prior organizing principle, has 
been evolved.46 
Nations that form ad hoc coalitions identify themselves as concerned members of the 
international community with a genuine interest in preventing or halting instances of deadly 
conflict. Unity of command typically is achieved in these coalitions through the vesting of 
overall command in a leader and the core of his staff from the state contributing the most 
troops. Like-minded nations often possess interoperable equipment, easing logistical 
problems, and many will have already conducted bilateral and multilateral military exercises. 
The resulting shared knowledge of operating doctrine and procedures of coalition partners 
aids in mission planning and executionY 
It is clear that Ad Hoc Force is independent from the UN Security Council's desire. 
For short term and specific objectives, the size and shape of force, and support for this force 
are formed and provided by the contributing states. Such a force may be configured by a 
coalition of individual states, by the some or all members of a regional organization, or by 
the members of two or more regional organizations. 
46 Ibid., p. 1 03. 
47 Andrew Goodpaster, When Diplomacy Is not Enough -Managing Multinational 
Military Interventions, New York, NY: Carnegie Corporation Press, 1996, p. 19. 
22 
2. On-call Force 
On-Call Force may be created by formal agreements with the Security Council in 
accordance with Article 43 obligations. Each member state may identify what contributes 
it can make, and then each of them may designate and provide forces that could be used 
collectively with the UN Security Council designation. 
On-call forces are part of a structure that has some prior organizing principle. 
However, they are not normally permanently assigned to this structure and are likely to be 
utilized for national purposes for much of the time, except for periodic exercises. In 
providing on-call contingents, governments allow themselves scope for determining the 
desirability, or otherwise, of participating in collective security actions and retain a measure 
of control over the direction of their forces. On-call forces can be defined as national units 
made available to a international authority when required, but over which there are still 
national claims and usually, by implication, national control.48 
3. Standing Force 
Under the UN Security Council direction, it may be possible to establish a UN standing 
multinational maritime force based on the model ofNATO's standing naval force structure. 
The Charter Article 43 makes feasible such a creation. Undoubtly, the configuration of a 
standing multinational maritime force under the UN banner depends on the degree to which 
UN member states are willing to cede control of national resources to the international body. 
A standing force consists of a set of integrated national contingents operating in 
concert, or contingents which have lost their national identity and have assumed a 
international character. Standing forces are centrally controlled by an authoritative 
international or global organization which takes primary responsibility for their military and 
political direction. Standing forces are likely to have a high degree of integration and 
interoperability in terms of tactical and strategic direction, military systems, logistics, 
communications and procedures. A standing force can be defined as a multinational force 
formally constituted and operating under a international, rather than a national structure, to 
48 o· ·_(:" IO" m11er, p. .:>. 
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· counter threats to collective interests, and under which there is a substantial devolution of 
national control.49 
The nature of standing forces suggests a permanent multinational collection of human 
and material resources existing in times of war and peace. This is in contrast to stand-by 
arrangements, in which naval vessels and personnel, as well as command, planning and 
support infrastructure, are ready to be put under international control in case of a crisis, but 
otherwise spend their time under full national control. 50 
D. MANAGEMENT CHOICES FOR MULTINATIONAL MARITIME 
FORCES 
The main role of the Security Council in multinational maritime operations would be 
to provide the ultimate source of legitimacy to make authoritative decisions on when, where, 
for what purpose and in which management system multinational maritime forces are to be 
used. The Security Council has three possible choices for managing such a force: the UN 
Authorization, the UN Designation, and the UN Direction.51 
1. UN Authorization 
Under this option, the Security Council would authorize- not mandate- action by 
member states or regional organizations to carry out its decisions. Nations or regional 
organizations would then decide, individually or collectively, what actions to take.52 
UN authorization may be the most appropriate management choice for Ad Hoc 
coalition forces in the context of suppressive peace operations. Coalition of willing -Ad Hoc 
49 Ibid.,p.l05. 
50 David Rudd, "Is a Standing UN Naval Force Realistic?," chapter in Multinational 
Naval Forces by Peter Haydon, Ann Griffiths, Halifax, Sofa Scotia Canada: Dalhousie 
University Press, 1995, p. 115. 
51 Sands suggests four management types: UN authorization, UN designation, UN 
direction on-call forces, and standing naval forces. 
52 Sands, p. 27. 
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coalition - and the legitimacy of the use of force provided by the Security Council may 
increase the effectiveness of operation and reduce risks and consequently casualties. 
2. UN Designation 
Under this option, due to the mission to be done, the Security Council may designate 
several member states, including a leader state which contributes the most assets, among the 
member states which commit to provide naval assets to the UN in accordance with the 
special agreements under Article 43. And then, under the leadership of a member state 
assigned by the Security Council, all contributing nations participate in multinational 
maritime operation. 
Instead of just Security Council authorization, the Security Council can designate a 
single country, group of countries, or regional organizations to organize, plan, and direct 
authorized collective action. Nations would contribute forces to the multinational operations 
as available or as requested by the accepted command authority, whether a single leader or 
a multinational structure. 53 
UN designation may be the most appropriate management option for On-Call forces · 
in the context of the non-military maritime missions. In this way, the Security Council may 
designate more than a single on-call force which are to be served in different regions in order 
to cope with different non-military missions at a time. 
3. UN Direction 
The Security Council, itself and its subsidiary organs, may organize, plan, and direct 
the multinational maritime operation to be done by a standing maritime force. Such a 
management option may be most appropriate to fulfill all possible UN maritime missions, 
especially for peace and security operations. 
UN direction will require (1) a willingness on the part of member states to forgo 
unilateral action in part or in whole; (2) willingness to subordinate some national assets to 
53 Ibid., p. 27-. 
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multinational command and commitment; and (3) a credible UN capability to direct and 
conduct military operations. 54 
E. NECESSITY OF UN STANDING MULTINATIONAL MARITIME FORCE 
AND ITS BENEFITS 
The governments of naval powers frequently employ their warships in a 'diplomatic' 
or 'political' mode, hoping to affect the thinking and change the behavior of adversary 
governments with little or no intention or expectation of using actual force. This is called 
'naval diplomacy'. Naval diplomacy seeks to evoke desired responses without having to 
apply force. In order to minimize the possibility of the use of force, this is the best way to 
contribute to enhancing international peace and stability in terms of UN maritime activities. 
Hence, this is, needless to say, the execution of naval diplomacy by the UN in the context 
of preventive operations and non-military missions. 
Naval diplomacy is carried out by means of five basic tactics. The first two, standing 
demonstrations of naval power and specific operational deployments represent naval power 
politics; the rest, naval aid, operational visits and specific goodwill visits are naval influence 
politics. Standing demonstrations of naval power or naval presences are a time-honored 
usage of navies. By threatening to use force at sea, or to project force ashore, such standing 
demonstrations seek to deter actions inimical to the deploying state, and to encourage actions 
that are in the interests of itself and its allies. 55 If the execution of naval diplomacy is the best 
way, is it possible to say the UN would be successful in its maritime activities without 
having a standing multinational maritime force? 
During the exercise of naval diplomacy, however, the main problem will often be the 
lack of diplomatic skill on land rather than the lack of professional quality at sea. 56 The 
54 Ibid., p. 44. 
55 K. Booth, Navies and Foreign Policy, New York: Holmes and Meier Press, New 
York, 1979, pp. 40-41. 
56 Ibid., p. 30. 
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construction of and the usage of multinational maritime forces and their effectiveness are all 
determined by the political context. This includes the institutional framework within which 
the forces will operate, major power politics, objectives of multinational cooperation, varied 
national objectives and expectations, and public perceptions. Whatever agreements and 
organizations within the UN Charter are appropriate to the creation of a multinational 
maritime force, multinational operations will present a number of political problems which 
must be resolved. In this sense, how can the UN be successful at reconciling different 
political perceptions in peacetime without having a standing multinational maritime force, 
without having several experiences in this area? Is it plausible to solve such diplomatic 
problems after the multinational maritime operation started? 
In the 21st century the high-tech nature of naval warfare will dictate major alterations 
ofthe structure of a navy. The developments in weapon technology has made it possible to 
pack enough firepower into even the smallest craft, so that small vessels or craft of minor 
navies may be in a position to threaten even the strongest naval units of a multinational 
maritime force. In addition to this reality, principles for multinational operations and 
requisites of multinational cooperation dictate several factors such as clear objectives, unity 
of effort, command arrangements, common doctrine and rules of engagement as the ways 
could lead to successful maritime operations. Nations, especially the members ofNATO, 
prepare for these operations through political interaction, exercises and war games, personnel 
exchanges, port visits, cultural, legal and language training, and equipment standardization 
programs with potential partners. This preparation serves routine peacetime political and 
military purposes and reduces the risks to a multinational force operating during a crisis or 
a war. Therefore it seems that the UN maritime operation based on on-call force, which is 
the present application, will be deprived from peacetime preparation. How does one expect 
a successful operation from such a force or how does one trust such a force? 
The advantage of standing naval forces is that they could be promptly available and 
could provide a viable way to inculcate interoperability procedures and capabilities at sea. 
Only through long practice of cooperation is it possible to leach out differences and to force 
accommodation and standardization where necessary. Further, if established, standing forces 
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would be an obvious force justifier for contributing countries, and would provide a testbed 
for improving operational effectiveness.57 
Can the UN realistically be expected to meet its present and future challenges without 
some built-in, immediately available military capability? The organization at present relies 
for its increasingly complex operations almost entirely on contingents and ad hoc logistical 
support from member governments. This means that its initial reactions are often hesitant and 
slow, and its capacity to stay the course uncertain. 58 
The UN and its members need to act much earlier and more decisively to try to head 
off or resolve crises - before so much violence has taken place that emotions become 
extremely hard to cool, and before actual and imminent loss of life by conflict, starvation, 
and disease reaches the acute stage. A small, permanent UN force could be very important 
for this purpose, and it should be complemented by an array of procedures for peaceful 
conflict prevention and conflict resolution help for rehabilitation and reconstruction, not only 
relief, as well as the threat or use of economic and political sanctions. 59 
The message is clear. In the immediate future, the best way of enhancing the UN's 
naval missions first requires the establishment of a standing multinational maritime force as 
a concrete structure to deal with the security issues in maritime environment of the world. 
Without doubt, a UN standing multinational maritime force will have the advantages of 
professional and specialized training, rapid reaction time, organizational efficiency and 
financial stability. 
If it is established, the UN standing multinational maritime force will serve five main 
functions: 
57 Sand, p. 45. 
58 Brian Urquhart, "Who Can Police the World?," The New York Review of Books, May 
12, 1994, p. 29. 
59 Robert Oakley, "A UN Volunteer Force- The Prospects," The New York Review of 
Books, July 15, 1993, p. 53. 
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• It will provide training experience for expected operations in future, which will 
enable participant navies to improve naval operations proficiency and the UN 
standard operating procedures development and evaluation. 
• It will provide evidence ofUN member solidarity. 
• It will provide the UN with a multinational ocean surveillance capability. 
• It will provide the Secretary-General with an immediate available combined force 
to be deployed to the scene of any possible contingency to reaffirm the solidarity 
of the UN family and provide a visible deterrent. 
• It will provide an instrument for naval policy, especially in terms of standing 
demonstrations of naval power on behalf of international peace and stability. 
With a modicum of political goodwill and cooperation, as well as some creative 
experimentation, to meet future security needs, the UN standing multinational maritime force 
seems likely to play a great role in the maritime environment. At this point, it needs stressing 
that the establishment of a UN standing multinational force can be a beginning, not the end. 
29 
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III. POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS AND PROBLEMS 
A. OVERVIEW 
Standing international naval forces have been advocated periodically throughout the 
twentieth century. In the aftermath of the First World War, a proposal for a League of 
Nations standing naval force was put before the United States Navy.60 After WW II, abortive 
discussions took place in the UN Military Staff Committee, over the formation of standing 
forces. The validity of standing forces has been re-examined after the Cold War and navies 
are regarded by some commentators as prime candidates for structural integration.61 
One of the first modern proposal for a UN Standing Naval Force (UN"SNF) was made 
by a Norwegian organization. It suggested that national ships be earmarked for a UN 
squadron on a rotational basis under the control of a UN commander who would be 
supported by an international staff of experts. Ships would join the UN squadron for three 
to six months. The annual sailing programme would be approved by the Secretary-General.62 
The idea of an experimental UN naval unit was also aired in the former Soviet Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, growing out of a proposal by Eduard Shevardnadze in September 1987 
for a UN task force to convoy merchant ships and ensure freedom of navigation in the 
Persian Gulf. Subsequently, at UN seminars in 1989 and 1990, the Deputy Foreign Minister, 
Vladimir Petrovsky, argued for an extension of UN activities to maritime operations. In its 
October 1990 Memorandum to the Security Council on strengthening the UN, the Soviet 
Government urged analysis of appropriate contingents provided by the permanent members 
of the Security Council. The Military Staff Committee would be required to plan options and 
60 US Navy, Memorandum for Chief of Naval Operations, 'Proposed Plans for 
Establishment of League ofNations Army and Navy', 11 November 1919, PD-179-1, 
Record Group 80, Secretary ofthe Navy, National Archives, Washington DC, cited in 
Jeffrey Sands, Blue Hulls: Multinational Naval Cooperation and the United Nations, 
paper for the Center for Naval Analyses, Alexandria, Va., 1992, Appendix, p.A-17. 
61 Ginifer, p.118. 
62 Ibid.,p.l18. 
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procedures for joint actions and control the naval forces of any UN members which were put 
at the Security Council's disposal. Regional structures might be developed and authorized 
by the UN to conduct operations. The costs would be borne by UN members according to 
their force contributions and ability to pay. Standing Joint Task Forces in each of the Atlantic 
and Pacific Oceans, with ships regularly rotated, would provide the basis for UN responses 
to regional conflicts. Joint training to co-ordinate fleet operations would be required, and 
perhaps a large exercise once every 2-3 years under UN auspices.63 
Michael Vlahos takes the view that the United States would be a key component in any 
UN standing force, and has called for the United States to take the lead in establishing a 
'Standing Naval Force, World'. He proposes that such a navy should move beyond the 
alliance concept which defined NATO and should become a permanent global force divided 
into Eastern and Western naval divisions. Vlahos stops short of suggesting that the UN 
should control this global force in any substantive sense. Instead, he envisages it as a 
permanent military coalition, in 'co-operative, voluntary association', with a permanent US 
naval contingent as its core. 64 
Other advocates, notably Sir Brian Urquhart, point out that the response from 
governments to the Charter idea of rapid deployment standby units has been at best non-
committal, and that present signs are not encouraging. He has long advocated the alternative 
of establishing a small, standing, highly-trained volunteer rapid response group as part of the 
UN itself to fulfil an evident increased need for a flexible, rapid response capability, reliably 
and immediately available for UN service.65 
Gwyn Prins has also suggested the creation of a global UN naval force structure and 
the development of UN standard operating procedures. This would be augmented by the 
development of a United Nations Command Center which would liaise with the National 
63 Ibid., p.119. 
64 Michael Vlahos, "A Global Naval Force? Why Not?," Proceedings, US Naval 
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Command Centers of those states contributing forces to UNSNF at time of crisis. UN as well 
as national pennants would be flown. In certain high intensity operations Prins envisages the 
switching of military command from National Command Authorities to the UN Command 
Center.66 
The construction of a UN standing multinational maritime force and its effectiveness 
are all determined by the political support for such forces among key participants in the UN. 
The political context is dynamic as nations and alliances adapt their policies, expectations 
and ambitions to the post-Cold War situation. This shifting dynamic complicates the 
development of multinational formations and the achievement of the political consensus 
essential for successful multinational undertakings.67 
The UN Charter provides for the establishment of a standing military force, and a 
military oversight committee (UN Charter Articles 43 and 47), but no standing UN military 
force has ever been created, and the oversight committee has been ineffectual.68 In particular, 
the member states of the UN seem more reluctant to transfer control of their armed forces 
than the Charter's authors had hoped. This may be partly due to reservations about the 
United Nations' existing machinery for directing military forces under its control, however, 
it may also be due to broader doubts about the United Nations' capacity to manage a world 
torn apart by a huge range of conflicts.69 
In actuality, the willingness or reluctance of states to contribute to the establishment 
of a UN standing multinational maritime force is a reflection of their political support for 
such a force. This chapter explains the characteristic problems and constraints of the political 
66 Ginifer, p.l19. 
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context that has engendered the member states' reluctance to construct a UN standing 
multinational maritime force. 
B. PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES OF THE UN CHARTER 
Since its establishment in 1945, the UN Charter has been frequently criticized in terms 
of its Purposes and Principles. In general, critics in the political literature argue that the 
Charter's Purposes and Principles are too idealistic to be realized or have higher standards 
than those which can not be fulfilled. Here are some excerpts: 
The document spoke to the highest aspirations of mankind (in its Purposes and 
Principles), but it was tempered by the realities of power (as reflected in voting 
procedures and requirements). Inconsistency has been and will be a result of the 
fact that the United Nations is a gathering of sovereign States and what it can do 
depends on the common ground that they can create between them 70 
The United Nations was established 'to maintain international peace and 
security ... ' It was also 'to achieve international cooperation in solving 
international problems of an economic, social, cultural or humanitarian 
character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for 
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or 
religion .. .' Yet the nations of the world who charged the UN with these great 
missions never permitted it to acquire the resources it needed to fulfill them.71 
A basic challenge is that the Charter is a manifesto and codification of rules, 
norms and principles of the world as it should be, not the world as it is. With all 
the stresses and strains, the glaring failures and inadequacies, and the errors of 
both omission and commission over the past 45 years at the United Nations, the 
fundamental goals of peace and security - individual, communal, and national; 
economic, social, and political- remain elusive for most of the world's people. 
70 Petrie, pp. 76-77. 
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Yet the UN is still the only forum where, in some form, and however perversely 
at times, the world's nation-state sit together.72 
The UN has always been a theater for standard-setting and myth-making - for 
appealing to higher standards than those which commonly prevail in 
international relations, and for holding out the promise of a better-ordered 
world.73 
At the first glance, it may be fashionable to say that these ideas are completely right. 
On the contrary, it can be said that the key point is not whether the Purposes and Principles 
of Charter were written with the highest aspirations of mankind. Indeed, the key point is 
what we wanted and what we protected. Nobody else wrote those purposes and principles, 
but we did them and, furthermore, we still keep them. 
The authors of the Charter were aware that it might have flaws, and might need 
revision. Consequently, they provided in Article 109 of the Charter for "A General 
Conference of the Members of the United Nations for the purpose of reviewing the present 
Charter." In paragraph 3 of Article 109 it states that: 
If such a conference has not been held before the tenth annual session of General 
Assembly following the coming into force ofthe present Charter, the proposal 
to call such a conference shall be placed on the agenda of that session of the 
General Assembly. 74 
Despite the frequent criticism of the UN, such a conference has never been called. If 
the Charter's Purposes and Principles are not reasonable for the present international system, 
why are not they revised? If these Purpose and Principles are fully adequate for collective 
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security, why are not they taken into account in real life? The problem is not the context of 
those purposes and principles, but the unwillingness of member states to accept the 
responsibilities which are emanated from the Charter. Probably, they have plausible reasons 
for forgetting that the UN belongs to its members - with all the benefits, problems, and, 
above all, responsibilities of ownership. 
Obviously, a statement of objectives or goals for an organization guarantees nothing 
toward their fulfillment, and if the goals have real importance or significance for the welfare 
of humankind, the process of fulfillment is of greater value than the verbalization of aims. 
On the other hand, whether achievable or not, the statement of objectives points the direction 
for action and gives shape to the program for the organization.75 
The statement of purposes in the UN Charter is both general and redundant. The aims 
are broad enough to express the desire of war-weary nations for an organization and program 
capable of helping them to avoid future military contests and to improve economic and social 
relationships among states. At the same time, general and vague goals provide a basis for 
ready agreement because they can suggest to the representatives of nations with divergent 
interests a variety of subgoals, interpretations, and means of implementation. 76 
An essential but self-evident principle of the Charter is the obligation of all members 
to fulfill in good faith all the obligations assumed by them in the Charter. This promise is 
nothing more or less than a statement of the basic norm underlying all international treaties 
and international law. Without this obligation the UN Charter has no real meaning beyond 
its literary value, since enforcement is dependent upon the actions of the individual members. 
Because the right to interpret such obligations also rests ultimately with individual states, the 
possibilities for state commitment to Charter obligations vary from vigorous action to a 
nullity.77 
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The principles constitute a substantial body ofbasic norms on which the UN structure 
and functions are superimposed. Although this group of norms is not always clear as to 
meaning and is not internally consistent, it represents, in combination with the purposes of 
the organization, the essential statement of the philosophy of the UN. Since a philosophy is 
not very useful without implementation, the international behavior of states will determine 
whether these norms or others are predominant in world politics. 78 
This situation is an essential reason for the absence of political support, and 
consequently lack of political consensus among the UN's member states for an effective UN. 
If a UN standing multinational maritime force is to be created, the international behavior of 
states will determine this establishment - not the UN Charter. In the present political 
environment, the perception or interpretation of the individual states does not reflect such a 
development. Political support and political consensus for collective security are a 
determining factor for the creation a multinational maritime force. Faced with such a 
problem, i.e., the absence of political support, and the absence of the unity of interpretation, 
the state commitments to Charter is a nullity in terms of the establishment a UN standing 
multinational maritime force. 
C. COLLECTIVE SECURITY 
It is now a cliche that a perception of real collective security has not yet emerged in 
international community, or that there is only limited agreement among the nations about the 
basis of international security. If it is true, this situation raises a question. \Vhy and how were 
the sovereign states able to create the UN without consensus on collective security? It is 
interesting that the UN Charter mentions collective security, international peace and security 
in many times in its context, but it never defines what their context are. 
The absence of a parallel culture internationally, however tolerable during the Cold 
War, is now a source of frustration. For example, the admission ofTurkey to NATO has been 
accepted despite its different culture from the Western countries. "While the collapse of 
78 Ibid., p.62. 
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communism has eliminated the major global clash of values, it has had an opposite effect on 
other nationalist, tribal, religious, economic, and ethnic conflicts that have been there for 
some time and may even reenergize North-South economic discord.79 
The conflict between civilizations engenders a major obstacle to collective security. 
The West is now at an extraordinary peak of power in relation to other civilizations. Its 
superpower opponent has disappeared from the map. Military conflict among Western states 
is unthinkable, and Western military power is unrivaled. Apart from Japan, the West faces 
no economic challenge. It dominates international political and security institutions and, with 
Japan, international economic institutions. Decisions made at the UN Security Council or in 
the International Monetary Fund that reflect the interests of the West are presented to the 
world as reflecting the desires of the world community. 80 
Differences in power and struggles for military, economic and institutional power are 
thus one source of conflict between the West and other civilizations. Differences in culture, 
that is basic values and beliefs, are a second source of conflict. Western ideas of 
individualism, liberalism, constitutionalism, human rights, equality, liberty, the rule of law, 
democracy, free markets, the separation of church and state, often have little rdonance in 
Islamic, Confucian, Japanese, Hindu, Buddhist or Orthodox cultures.81 This situation 
explains why nations do not behave in harmony in terms of collective security. 
In addition to the clash of civilizations, it is a reality that sovereign states, as the 
fundamental units in the international system, have different as well as mutual interests. 
Nobody should necessarily expect relations among the nations, including the major powers, 
to be always good. Such differences of interests are, of course, reflected in the proceedings 
of the UN Security Council and in the contribution to the decision of the UN Security 
Council dealing with to act. 
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Each state, first of all, strives to protect its own national interests by using scarce 
resources. The fact that resources are scarce causes the emergence of different priorities for 
each state since each has the same or different resources which are limited and have different 
quality and quantity. One suspects that, the problem related with collective security is the 
conflict of the sovereign states' priorities. Collective security, which is the one of the 
sovereign states' mutual interests, succumbs to the lure of unilateral interests. 
This conflict, as a fact of real life, plays a great role in collective security in terms of 
timing and contribution. Different national perceptions of timing and contribution may not 
create a handicap for ad hoc coalitions, but it is a tangible obstacle to determine mutually 
acceptable objectives and provide unity of efforts. This situation makes impossible the 
emergence of a continuous and sufficient framework, which must include political and 
financial support, necessary for the establishment of a UN standing multinational maritime 
force. 
The dilemmas which states are likely to encounter when divergence between national 
and collective policies occur will prove more difficult to resolve if the goal is the creation 
of standing forces than if looser structures are intended. Standing forces may become 
engaged in operations contrary to the interests of member states which have close 
commercial, cultural or ethnic links with the target of sanctions. In rudimentary structures, 
contributing states might have the freedom to avoid involvement in operations they regard 
as undesirable. However, in any advanced structure this power of veto might be eroded or 
states would be, in effect, politically coerced into participating. Commitment to a standing 
force might also severely limit the scope for withdrawal from an operation which proved 
domestically unpopular. 82 
Without the commonly accepted definitions of collective security, international peace 
and security and the classification of threats to international peace within the UN Charter 
context, these questions arise: 
82 Ginifer, p.106. 
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• How can one limit and define that what is the broader of national sovereignty and 
what is the border or dimension of collective action? 
• How can one prevent the exploitation of the differences and contradictions of the 
existing civilizations? 
Without establishing a framework which answers to these questions mentioned above: 
• How can one define the UN naval missions and the context of these missions? 
• How can one provide and promote the multinational cooperation for collective 
security? 
• How can one define the authority in a UN naval operation and its limits? 
D. AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITY 
There is a widely held belief that the UN has a double standard. Generally, the 
criticisms of its operations are on the basis that there were not a specific sensitivity and 
rapidity to act against conflicts or aggressions in a same manner. For example, action against 
the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq was clearer and quicker than the action against Bosnia 
conflict. 
There is an unbreakable link between responsibility and authority: no one can be held 
responsible for an action if he is not invested with the authority to do so. This means that, 
the UN cannot be held responsible when it has no authority to act. 83 There is a common 
misperception about the work of the United Nations. It is obvious that the UN is not a 
supranational organization. In accordance to the fundamental dimensions and dynamic 
processes of the international system, the functions and activities of the UN, in other words, 
its Charter, are moulded by the sovereign states. The UN Charter confers on the Security 
Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and stability. The 
UN's ability to act depends on the minimal consensus in the Security Council.84 Specifically, 
83 Petrie, pp. 7 6-77. 
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common public expectations of the Security Council most frequently fail to take into account 
the Charter's requirement for at least a minimal consensus. 85 In the absence of this 
consensus, the UN lacks authority to act. 
A distinction must be made between international peace and international stability. 
These are not the same things. International peace comes from international stability which 
is emanated from the consensus between major powers. International stability does not mean 
a world expunged of war or conflicts. If the consensus between major powers is 
disagreement and consequently the decision of the Security Council is no-action or to stay 
silent, it is behalf of international stability in order to prevent large-scale conflicts. In this 
sense, it can be said that the UN will never help to solve each international security problem, 
especially in a case which is inimical to any major power's interests. 
But this situation damages the credibility and trustworthiness of the UN and 
consequently reduces political support in terms of contribution of national contingents for 
a standing multinational maritime force. If the UN will not intervene each international 
security problem, is it feasible and reasonable to maintain a standing mul~inational maritime 
force within the UN organization? In such a case, sovereign states will probably be reluctant 
to contribute UN operations and to establish a UN standing multinational maritime force. 
E. PEACEKEEPING AND PEACE ENFORCEMENT 
The distinction between peacekeeping and peace enforcement is clear in principle. So 
must be the prerequisite of local consent. But, it is not clear how it works in practice. 
Traditionally, UN peacekeeping involves an operation without enforcement powers to 
help maintain or restore peace in areas of conflict at the request of parties and with their full 
consent and cooperation. On the other hand, UN peace enforcement is an operation which 
is an action of a deterrent or coercive nature, taken without the consent of both parties, to 
counter a threat to the peace, to suppress aggression or to deal with breaches of the peace. 
Peacekeepers are primarily constabulary in nature; beyond limited self-defense, they are not 
85 Petrie, p.77. 
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expected to perform combat missions. Peace enforcers, by contrast, must have both offensive 
and defensive combat capabilities, although they can also be cross-trained in peacekeeping 
roles. 
It is evident that the reality does not always match these descriptions. The line between 
consensual peacekeeping and Chapter VII enforcement will increasingly blur in future. For 
example, consent once given could be withdrawn, leaving UN forces caught in a crossfire 
ofhostile parties. Peacekeepers must always be able to fight in self-defense, and should be 
alert to and prepared for the possibility of broader combat action if a situation changes. 86 
At this point, it is useful to look at what Chapters VI and VII say. Chapter VI: Pacific 
Settlement of Disputes, mentions the essentials of the conflict resolution in terms of the 
diplomatic process. In summary, it encourages a diplomatic process of investigation, 
recommendation, and negotiation that has been frequently used since the UN was 
established. It reflects the desire to solve conflicts and disputes without resort to force. 
Contrary to the common perception, Chapter VI does not say anything about the prerequisite 
of local consent, and the use of force. 
There are new questions about the consent of the parties to UN deployment. One 
peacekeeping force, UNIKOM, has been imposed on Iraq under Chapter Seven, which 
invokes enforcement measures; another, the peacekeeping operation in the former 
Yugoslavia, UNPROFOR, has also deployed forces without the explicit consent of the 
parties to their composition or command. There is a tendency now to move away from the 
consent and co-operation principle. 87 
Chapter VII: Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and 
Acts of Aggression, mentions the actions determined by the Security Council. These actions 
include economic sanctions and military measures. This chapter also defines how member 
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states should contribute to these actions. In short, Chapter VII points to actions in which the 
use of force is allowed, if the disputing parties deny Chapter VI. In other words, if there is 
any military involvement or any economic measures determined by the UN, this means that 
Chapter VII is in process, not Chapter VI. In this sense, it is unrealistic to say that 
peacekeeping operations are executed under Chapter VI. 
Article 1 of the Charter has it that the first purpose of the UN is the maintenance of 
international peace and security. There are concrete measures set out in the Charter to ensure 
this, both in Chapter Six, which talks about the 'pacific settlement of disputes' -finding 
solutions by negotiation, conciliation, mediation, and other peaceful means- and in Chapter 
Seven, which provides for enforcement measures in case of threats to international peace and 
security, if Chapter Six doesn't work. But 'peacekeeping' is not mentioned in either 
chapter.88 
On the other hand, the prevailing interpretation of these chapters is quite different. In 
peacekeeping missions, the traditional perception of force structure and its equipments 
causes the emergence of hesitations in terms of the assignment of national contingents 
because of the risky operation. While the UN Charter includes nothing about force size and 
composition, the UN binds itself because of the traditional perception. What is the main 
objective of operation? To protect the disputing parties from the peaceful community or to 
protect the peaceful community from the disputing parties? In practice, the UN trusts 
disputing parties but not peaceful community. If we must create a distinction between 
peacekeeping and peace enforcement, this distinction should be done with respect to 
objectives, directives and procedures for each operation, but not force size and composition 
or in the terms defined politically. 
Aside from the cost in money, men, and equipment, the major obstacles to a standing 
UN force have been, and remain, the reservations of thoughtful military leaders about 
inadequate command and control, the lack of a clear mandate, clear rules of engagement, and 
insufficient resources for the specific mission to be undertaken. The usual UN peacekeeping 
88 Ibid.,p.lO. 
43 
practices, including command and control from a UN headquarters whose planning has been 
vague, and whose logistics have been weak, are widely considered to be militarily 
unworkable. If this system continues unchanged, no self-respecting military commander (or 
political leader) would willingly send his or her forces into harm's way under the exclusive 
authority of the Security Council and under the day-to-day direction of the Secretary-
General. This traditional approach is a formula for confusion, failure, and potential disaster. 89 
A well-written mandate, embracing the political objectives and constraints and the 
military objectives and degrees of force that may be employed, will furnish clear guidance 
for conducting the operation, sizing the force, and drawing up initial plans.90 
A clear mandate is vital to effective execution of any peace mission. However, the UN 
Security Council resolutions are often ambiguous political documents to accommodate 
divergent national interests (e.g., over eighty separate resolutions on Bosnia). Unity of 
purpose and an integrated political, military, and humanitarian relief strategy are vital for 
success in major peace operations. However, unity and integration are often vitiated during 
execution of the mission because nations and organizations comprising multilateral peace 
mission sometimes pursue their own views and interests at the expense of the overall 
mission.91 
In terms of multinational maritime operations, the distinction between peacekeeping 
and peace enforcement does not make a difference with respect to force structure and type 
because of the nature of the naval forces. But, this situation does affect the determination and 
application of the rules of engagement (ROEs). ROEs is a defining factor for multinational 
maritime operations. The definition of ROEs is clear and unambiguous: " The matching of 
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political control to executive power in a clear and readily understood fashion."92 With the 
crucial distinction between peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions, determining 
ROEs at the outset of an operation is, and will be, always difficult, especially in 
multinational action involving the forces of different nations. As evidenced in the Gulf and 
Adriatic operations, formation and implementation can be difficult in multinational 
operations. Ideally, all units of such a force should operate under the same ROEs; if they do 
not, the force's efficiency and effectiveness are reduced. Reaching agreement, which can be 
hard enough at the national level, is infinitely more difficult for multinational forces because 
more factors and different political perspectives come into play.93 In addition, the problems 
introduced by multinationality stem not only from the determining rules of engagement, but 
also from the fact that each nation has a different ROE philosophy and interprets the relevant 
terms, such as 'hostile act' or 'hostile intent', in a different way. 
This situation requires political and military consensus to define ROEs for UN 
operations. So far, the UN has not had such a consensus. On the other hand, in the aftermath 
of the Cold War, most Western societies have begun to reduce the size of their military 
inventories. Consequently, their naval units have become more valuable for national 
requirements than they had in the past. Therefore, without widely accepted and 
acknowledged ROEs, the member states of the UN will probably continue to be reluctant to 
assign their naval units to a UN standing multinational maritime force because nations do 
not want to put their valuable units at stake. 
F. MEMBERSHIP 
One might believe that it is simple and straightforward to identify a nation, argue that 
all nations should be members of the United Nations, and automatically recognize the 
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membership of all such identifiable nations.94 But, it is not automatic that all countries are 
members of the UN or the UN membership of a state does not depend on just only its 
willingness. 
Procedures are provided in Article 4 of the Charter for the membership. This article 
specifies that: "Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving states 
which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter ... able to carry out these 
obligations ... the admission of any such state to membership in the United Nations will be 
affected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security 
Council." Procedures are also provided in Article 5 for the temporary suspension or 
expulsion of members following recommendations of the Security Council and action by the 
General Assembly. 
It is obvious that, Article 4 seeks for three fundamental features: being a peace-loving 
sovereign state, accepting the obligations of the Charter, and being able to carry out these 
obligations. If all of the members of the UN had to match this description, how many 
members could there be in the UN? Why is the Security Council recommendation required 
for the admission of any state to membership in the UN and temporary suspension or 
expulsion of members? If recommendation is necessary, does the veto right of permanent 
members affect negatively these procedures? It is well known issue that the supporters of 
international terrorism are still the members ofthe UN. Additionally, the UN Charter does 
not have any procedure for temporary suspension or expulsion of any permanent member. 
If the UN is responsible for international peace and security as a universal organization, and 
if a permanent member is an aggressor, how does the UN fulfill its responsibility? This issue, 
keeping the rules which are non-applicable to real life, undermine the credibility and long-
term legitimacy of the UN as a whole. 
If an organization is not able to protect itself and its purposes and principles, how will 
it provide international peace and security? Is it plausible to assign permanent military forces 
94 Wendel Gordon, The United Nations at the Crossroads of Reform, Armonk, M. E. 
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to such an organization? How does the UN provide the requisites of multinational maritime 
cooperation without confidence in procedures at all levels? 
G. DECISION-MAKING PROCESS 
If the United Nations is indeed a universal organization which is responsible for 
international peace and security, its system of decision-making must be seen as legitimate. 
The structure of the Security Council, as the decision-making organ, including the system 
of five veto-wielding permanent members, is in danger oflosing its legitimacy. 
The Security Council, which has the power to order the use of force to compel nations 
to make peace, is made up of representatives from fifteen of the member countries.95 The five 
permanent places go automatically to the so-called great powers- the permanent members 
that dominated the writing of the original charter at San Francisco in 1945: the United States, 
Britain, France, China, and the Soviet Union (now Russia). The occupants of the other ten 
places are elected for two-year terms by the General Assembly.96 The Charter provides that, 
in the election, due regard shall be paid "to the contribution of Members of the United 
Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of 
the Organization, and also to equitable geographical distribution."97 
The problem is that this structure does not reflect the realities of the contemporary 
world. It does not include on a continuing basis the economic superpowers, Germany and 
Japan, or the largest regional powers such as India, Brazil or Nigeria, or relatively wealthy 
countries like Canada and Italy. Nor does it fully reflect the availability of military power for 
United Nations purposes. 98 Yet proposals to promote certain countries to permanent 
membership are quickly enmeshed in political objections. For example, Japan and Germany 
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have strong claims, as the second - and third - largest contributors to the UN budget, but 
would their neighbors be happy with the change? And given the special responsibility of the 
permanent members to maintain peace and security, should permanent membership be 
granted to Japan, whose constitution restricts it in sending forces abroad?99 It is not 
reasonable to suggest that the five winners of the Second World War, with the assistance of 
10 additional, rotating member states, comprise a representative, legitimate, or authoritative 
voice for a UN membership of 186.100 
Expanding the Security Council seems one of the more reasonable ways to improve 
the representative character - and thus the legitimacy - of the world organization in the eyes 
of its 186 members and their people. Increasing the council's overall size from the present 
15 members would allow more nations to participate on a rotating basis in decision-making 
by this critically important organ. 101 There is a widespread agreement that there should be 
additional permanent or non-rotating members of the Security Council. At the same time, the 
number of rotating members should be raised from 1 0 to 13. An expanded Council is more 
likely to win the confidence necessary to implement proposals such as a standing military 
force to provide a rapid response to security threats. 102 
The number of permanent and rotating members is a problematic issue. A formal 
change in structure of the Security Council seems very hard to achieve, even it is desirable. 
In 1945, the UN has been established by five major powers in accordance with, most likely, 
the multipolar system approach. Unfortunately, almost immediately following the creation 
of the UN, the bipolar system has dominated the international affairs because of the Cold 
War. If we are now saying that the Cold War is over, and multi polarity dominates again, 
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why do not we rearrange the structure of the UN Security Council? Are major powers the 
same powers of 1945? 
An Agenda for Peace is particularly interesting for its recognition of the importance 
of regional organizations. It urges that there be a partnership between these organizations and 
the UN, not a shuffling of responsibilities between them. But, enlarging the international 
security role of regional organizations is easier said than done. These organizations have a 
bewildering variety of purposes and memberships, and they often have great difficulty in 
reaching decisions and in taking action. Many regional bodies are seen as too partial to one 
side. 103 In order to provide and promote international peace and security, the decision-making 
process in the UN must be done more collectively by increasing the participation of member 
states in this process. At the same time, such a development will help to cooperate with 
regional organizations. 
Western domination of the UN Security Council and its decisions, tempered only by 
occasional abstention by China, produced UN legitimation of the West's use of force to drive 
Iraq out of Kuwait and the elimination of Iraq's sophisticated weapons and capacity to 
produce such weapons. It also produced the quite unprecedented action by the United States, 
Britain and France in getting the Security Council to demand that Libya hand over the Pan 
Am 103 bombing suspects and then to impose sanctions when Libya refused. The West in 
effect is using international institutions, military power and economic resources to run the 
world in ways that will maintain Western predominance, protect Western interests and 
promote Western political and economic values. That at least is the way in which non-
Westerns see the new world, and there is a significant element of truth in their views. 104 
In the light of the immensity of world seas and the dimension of UN naval missions 
and supporting tasks, wide participation in decision-making process is necessary for 
collective security. But, the present situation does not have such a configuration. This 
103 Roberts, p.8. 
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situation is the most important reason for the absence of political support in terms of the 
creation of UN standing multinational maritime forces. 
Without doubt, the veto right of each permanent member is also another problematic 
issue. The intent of the qualified-majority approach - which means that nine votes are 
required for approval, including affirmative votes or abstentions by all the permanent 
members - is to ensure that the organization does not make decisions that any permanent 
member of the Security Council opposes. Clearly, it would not further the maintenance of 
international peace and security for the United Nations to take decisions that one of these 
major powers considered inimical to its national interests. 105 
In order to maintain the organization's semblance of effectiveness and solvency, the 
UN Security Council must continue to keep the permanent membership and their veto rights. 
International peace and security are drawn from stability. In this respect, the permanent 
members, again as major powers with major interests in the international system, can control 
whether the resolution of the Security Council is inside the bounds of their mutual interests. 
The veto right, is not an obstacle to the creation ofUN standing maritime forces. 
H. ADMINISTRATIVE, PERSONNEL AND PLANNING 
The UN Charter has no obstacle to the establishment of a standing military force and 
an advisory Military Staff Committee. Articles 43 and 47 provide, respectively: 
"All members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance 
of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security 
Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, 
armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including the rights of passage, necessary 
for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security." 
"There shall be established a Military Staff Committee to advise and assist the 
Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council's military 
105 Petrie, p.78. 
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requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security, the 
employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, the regulation of 
armaments, and possible disarmament .... The Military Staff Committee, with 
the authorization of the Security Council and after consultation with appropriate 
regional agencies, may establish regional subcommittees." 
The UN has 185 member states. To date, the member states have been unwilling to 
provide the necessary resources for the UN to conduct operations with full effectiveness. No 
UN standing maritime force has ever been created, the Military Staff Committee has been 
ineffectual, and regional subcommittees have never been established. 
Formal responsibility for planning, organizing, mounting, sustaining and accounting 
for duly authorized UN operations lies with the UN Secretariat in New York. The increasing 
role of the UN in international security requires its capacity sufficient to manage a huge 
range of conflicts. 
Once a UN operation has been deployed, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations 
(DPKO) in New York is the principal organ of management with the Military Adviser 
(MILAD) maintaining contact with the Force Commander and serving as a source of 
continuous advise for the Secretary-General. At present, the permanent staff of the DPKO 
includes 18 political officers and 8 military officers attached to the MILAD's Office. 106 
The lack of personnel for pre-deployment planning and continuous operational 
oversight has been a major source of the difficulties in contemporary UN operations. This 
issue is related of course, to a particular and long-standing deficiency in the UN system: the 
lack of military expertise available to the Secretary-General. The small number of officers 
assigned to the MILAD's Office is only one aspect ofthe problem. 107 It is worthwhile to 
compare this with NATO's staffing. There are approximately 3,750 people employed at 
NATO Headquarters on a full-time basis. Ofthese, some 2,150 are members of national 
106 Mats R. Berdal, "Whither UN Peacekeeping?," London: ADELPHI Paper no. 281, 
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delegations and national military representatives to NATO. There are approximately 1,180 
civilian members of the International Staff and 420 members of the International Military 
Staff including 80 civilian personnel. Since 1994, a number of Cooperation Partner 
representatives also have liaison offices at NATO Headquarters. 108 
Neither the Secretary-General nor the Security Council has a military adviser; the 
senior military officer in the UN is now the recently appointed three-star Assistant Secretary-
General for Planning and Support in the DPKO, supplementing the two-star military adviser 
to the Under-Secretary-General (USG). This means that Security Council resolutions are not 
subjected to a cold, hard military feasibility study before being published. The unrealistic 
nature of many of these resolutions may reflect the consensus possible in the Council, but 
they do nothing for the reputation and standing of the UN, nor for those commanders in the 
field who, using them as their mandate, have to tum them into practical operational 
directives. 109 
An additional factor which has tended to reduce the managerial capacity of the 
MILAD' s Office has been the absence of advanced information-processing and management 
systems, secure communications facilities and computerized database systems to store 
operational information of a military as well as political nature that can be disseminated to 
missions. 1 10 
A well-structured and staffed headquarters is essential to any military force. It is from 
the headquarters that an operation is conducted, courses of action considered, plans drawn 
up and directives, orders, and instructions issued. There must be good communication-\vithin 
the headquarters and the technical means to communicate outside, as well as a basic 
understanding within about its function and how it needs to work. An ad hoc grouping of 
national representatives under an appointed UN commander is not a viable headquarters, and 
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there are many examples of how such a rudimentary structure has impeded the success of UN 
operations. 111 
The equipment and infrastructure- material, lodging, supply, administration, and C3 
(command, control and communication) -that support UN maritime operations are inevitable 
requisites for the establishment of a UN standing multinational maritime force. It is clear that 
the UN' s existing machinery for directing military forces under its control is not sufficient 
to manage and to support multinational maritime operations effectively and efficiently. In 
addition to these shortcomings, navies are expensive, and nations rarely have all the ships 
and personnel they feel they need for their own effective defense and enforcement. Any ship 
lent to the UN is one less ship available to the donor nation. 112 
Although the UN has been increasingly involved in naval operations, there is at present 
no clear overarching naval management structure for their oversight. This has been evident 
in the UN naval initiatives in the Persian Gulf, the Adriatic and Cambodia where differing 
management structures have been the product of expediency rather than a rigo~ous 
management logic. 113 
One school maintains that, to be effective, international action can only be taken 
through the leadership and initiative of one or two powerful and willing states - as in Desert 
Storm, for example, or Somalia. The other school holds that the UN is a universal 
organization representing the interests of all governments, and its members must be allowed 
to participate fully in its decisions and actions. The first opens the UN to accusations of 
elitism, special interests, and even neocolonialism. The second raises questions about the 
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organization's competence, its ability to make and carry out tough decisions, and the strength 
of its political and military leadership. 114 
To survive as a useful international organization the UN clearly needs the backing 
of the more powerful countries, and it also needs a stronger capacity to deal with situations 
where no great power interest is involved and where it must call on the support of all its 
members. The argument that the UN does not have the capacity to direct and control 
complex operations is often made by governments that really do not want it to do so. The 
denial of the authority or resources to develop its capacity to act effectively will inevitably 
perpetuate the UN' s weaknesses. 115 
Faced with such considerations, it is very understandable why member states of the 
UN are reluctant to transfer control of their naval forces and why they prefer ad hoc or on-
call operations. As a result of this tendency and consequently the lack of political support and 
consensus, the final product is UN' s insufficient capacity to manage military operations. In 
such a situation, it is too hard to create a standing maritime force under the control of the UN 
in the current international affairs. 
I. THE US LEADERSHIP, THE UN AND NATO 
The United States, as the only global power, must lead. Europe - as individual states 
or as a collective - cannot. China, Russia, India, Brazil, and Japan are important regional 
powers, but only the United States can lead on the full range of political, diplomatic, 
economic, and military issues confronting the world. 116 This is a reality. In the Bosnian 
conflict, for example, the West remained paralyzed until the United States wrested control 
of the diplomatic process. 
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In this sense, the US leadership is crucial for collective security. And it is well-known 
fact that the US supports the UN, as a international organization, and NATO, as a regional 
organization, in terms of international peace and security. Here are some excerpts: 
As the UN marks its 50th year, we are determined to help remake the way 
the UN works: more effectively, and in keeping with its strengths and 
limitations. We will not sacrifice American sovereignty, but neither will we heed 
calls to destroy an institution that serves our interests and the interests of peoples 
everywhere in building a more peaceful and prosperous world. With our 
leadership, the UN is streamlining and modernizing peacekeeping operations 
and has established an independent inspector general. But much more needs to 
be done. We are using our permanent seat on the UN Security Council and 
bringing our considerable weight to bear to make sure that the UN more 
effectively responds to crises in a manner consistent with US interests. 117 
In the last two years, we have made considerable progress in adapting the 
institutions of European security to extent stability to a free, undivided, and 
democratic Europe. At NATO's summit in January 1994, President Clinton 
proposed, and NATO approved, the Partnership for Peace (PfP) the first security 
partnership that can encompass all the nations of the continent .... We will 
continue to expand the Partnership's joint exercise program in 1995. Finally, the 
Partnership is the best path to NATO membership for those willing and able to 
make the necessary commitments. The NATO alliance will remain the anchor 
of American engagement in Europe and the linchpin of transatlantic security. 
That is why we must keep it strong, vital, and relevant. 118 
The United States, as a global power, declares its willingness to promote international 
peace and security. At this point, a question raises: how does the US support these 
organizations or what is the importance given these organizations? 
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Before answering this question, it is worthwhile to mention about what NATO is and 
how it works. And what is the present picture which reflects the positions of the UN and 
NATO. 
The North Atlantic Treaty of April1949 brought into being an Alliance of independent 
countries with a common interest in maintaining peace and defending their freedom through 
political solidarity and adequate military defense to deter and, if necessary, repel all possible 
forms of aggression against them. Created within the framework of Article 51 of the UN 
Charter, which reaffirms the inherent right of individual or collective defense, the Alliance 
is an organization of free states united in their determination to preserve their security 
through mutual guarantees and stable relations with other countries. 119 
The North Atlantic Council (NAC) has effective political authority and powers of 
decision and consists of Permanent Representatives of all member countries meeting together 
at least once a week. The Council also meets at higher levels involving Foreign Ministers or 
Heads of Government but it has the same authority and powers of decision-making, and its 
decisions have the same status and validity, at whatever level it meets. All 16 member 
countries of NATO have an equal right to express their views round the Council table. 
Decisions are the expression of the collective will of member governments arrived at by 
common consent. All member governments are party to the policies formulated in the 
Council or under its authority and to the consensus on which decisions are based. 120 
It is obvious that both the UN and NATO have very similar purposes and principles 
with the exception of the decision-making process. If we look at the present situation in these 
organizations, we can develop an interesting picture. 
NATO, as a regional organization, includes three permanent ofthe Security Council; 
the United Kingdom, United States and France. IfNA TO were to expand to include Russia, 
it would then include all permanent members of the UN except China. The structure created 
within NATO, with the US leadership, enable member countries to coordinate their policies 
119 NATO Handbook, Brussels; NATO Office and Information and Press, 1995, p.17. 
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in order to fulfill organization's complementary tasks. They provide for continuous 
consultation and cooperation in political, economic and other non-military fields as well as 
the formulation of joint plans for the common defense; the establishment of the infrastructure 
needed to enable military forces to operate; and arrangements for joint training programmes 
and exercises. Underpinning these activities is a complex civilian and military structure 
involving administrative, budgetary and planning staffs. Moreover, NATO has its standing 
military forces including Army, Naval and air assets, and with its 16 members, and NATO 
is able to support and finance these forces. 
On the other hand, the United Nations, as an international organization and as a unique 
global collective security organization, has 186 member states including all members of 
NATO, but the UN does not have a developed civilian and military structure similar to 
NATO's. Furthermore, the UN does not have standing military forces. Some claim that the 
UN does not have such forces because of scant financial resources. It my be asked why the 
UN - with its 186 members including all NATO members - could not support such forces. 
Maybe, it is reasonable to say that the UN could not be strengthened in terms of its 
organization and structure because of its passive position during the Cold War. This situation 
is a result of political perceptions but not economic issues. 
The United States, as a hegemon, is likely to see considerable advantages in ad hoc or 
on-call forces where it might exercise a controlling influence. By devolving command and 
control to an international organization, the United States would yield this hegemony. The 
United States is not averse to chopping operational control to trusted allies and has 
occasionally seconded units to peacekeeping operations under the operational or tactical 
control of a foreign commander. But ceding national command of components is another 
matter. Although US Naval Forces have been placed under NATO operational control as a 
matter of routine, both major NATO commanders to whom they have been assigned are 
American: SACLANT (Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic) and SACEUR (Supreme 
Allied Commander Europe). 121 
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Firstly, this perception may explain why NATO has its own standing forces and why 
the UN does not. That is why the United States advocates the Combined and Joint Task 
Forces (CJTF). It can be said that the United States is not alone in this perception. Regional 
hegemons, such as China and India, are likely to resist standing forces in case they pave the 
way for external intervention in their spheres of influence. 
Secondly, If a UN standing multinational maritime force will be established, which 
countries will contribute to that? Most probably, this creation will be realized by several 
countries which have already participated in the current operations. These countries are, 
generally, NATO members. In terms of the establishment a standing multinational maritime 
force, these states are likely to prefer NATO rather than the UN because ofNATO's civilian 
and military structure involving administration, budgetary and planning staff. And they have 
already done it. It is unrealistic to expect from this countries to contribute to a second 
standing multinational maritime force. 
At the moment, the UN has no command structure of its own, and it has customarily 
chosen a force commander from a country and put the entire operation in his hands. With 
staff officers from many countries who have. never met, and troops who have never trained 
together, the potential for trouble in combat is great, which makes NATO a prime candidate 




The end of the Cold War has offered the world an opportunity for more effective 
cooperation to prevent or remove all disputes, which threaten the international peace and 
security, and to promote economic and social welfare in friendly relations between the 
nations. The change in superpower relations and the responsible position taken by the Russia 
have allowed the United Nations to become increasingly active in collective security issues. 
For example, in just six years, 1988-1993, the United Nations created eighteen new 
peacekeeping operations, compared with a total of thirteen in its first forty-three years. Five 
peacekeeping operations were established during 1988 and 1989 alone, and, in 1991 and 
1992, the UN Security Council created another nine operations. In October 1993, there were 
seventeen active UN missions, compared to only five in 1987. Sixteen are still active in the 
summer of 1996. It is quite clear that the United Nations has and will probably continue to 
have an increasing role in security issues. 
At the same time, the impact of increasingly intensive use of the seas, pressure on the 
ecological balance, humanitarian issues, and threats to the maritime security has compelled 
and still compels the nations to cooperate with each other, and collectively, regulate and 
direct the maritime activities. As mentioned in Chapter II, many nations, especially the 
Western countries, recognize the importance of common maritime security embracing 
environmental, social and economic factors as well as the more traditional naval elements, 
and they have indicated their willingness to the multinational maritime cooperation. 
The potential emergence of a responsible security mechanism in the UN Security 
Council and the multinational cooperation desire of the states have raised the expectation that 
the UN might become an appropriate institutional mechanism for maritime cooperation. 
Consequently, this expectation has engendered two vital requisites. First, if the UN is to 
become an effective mechanism for enhancing international maritime security as well as 
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international peace and security, a coherent maritime conceptual framework must be 
articulated. Secondly, such a mechanism must be able to deploy maritime forces whenever 
and wherever they are required. 
As a result of these developments, the idea of the establishment of a UN standing 
maritime force has been proposed as an important possible contributor to promote and 
support international maritime security and stability. The UN Charter itself has no obstacle 
to the establishment of a standing military force and an advisory Military Staff Committee. 
Article 43 and 47 provide that, 
and, 
"All members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance 
of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security 
Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, 
armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including the rights of passage, necessary 
for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security." 
"There shall be established a Military Staff Committee to advise and assist the 
Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council's military 
requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security, the 
employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, the regulation of 
armaments, and possible disarmament. ... The Military Staff Committee, with 
the authorization of the Security Council and after consultation with appropriate 
regional agencies, may establish regional subcommittees." 
The UN has 185 member states to provide military or fmancial contributions. To date, 
the member states have been unwilling to provide the necessary resources for the UN to 
conduct operations with full effectiveness. No UN standing maritime force has ever been 
created, the Military Staff Committee has been ineffectual, and any regional subcommittee 
has never been established. 
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B. FINDINGS 
This thesis has posed a central question: whether it is possible to establish a UN 
standing maritime force in the foreseeable future, and whether there are political problems 
obstacle to such a development in the United Nations context. 
In answer to this question, the establishment of a UN standing maritime force faces a 
huge array of political problems. First, in the political literature Purposes and Principles of 
the UN Charter has been frequently criticized since they have been found too idealistic to be 
realized. Despite the common criticism of the Charter's Purposes and Principles, any general 
conference for the purpose of reviewing the present Charter has never been called while even 
the Charter has permitted such a revision. (Articles 108 and 109). If the Charter's Purposes 
and Principles are not reasonable for the present international system, why are not they 
revised? If these Purpose and Principles are fully adequate for collective security, why are 
not they taken into account in real life? The problem is not the context of those purposes and 
principles, but the unwillingness of member states to accept the responsibilities which are 
emanated from the Charter. This situation is an essential reason for the absence of political 
support, consequently political consensus, of the UN's member states for an effective UN. 
The second source of political problems affecting the creation of a UN standing 
maritime force is collective security perception. While the collapse of communism has 
eliminated the major global clash of values, it has had an opposite. effect on other nationalist, 
tribal, religious, economic, and ethnic conflicts that have been there for some time and may 
even reenergize North-South economic discord. The conflict between civilizations a major 
obstacle to the collective security in practice. In addition to the clash of civilizations, it is a 
reality that sovereign states have different as well as mutual interests. Collective Security, 
which is the one of the sovereign states' mutual interests, succumbs to the lure of their 
unilateral interests. All governments take their decisions in the name of national interest and 
than explain them in terms of self-sacrificing altruism. This approach plays a great role in 
the failure of collective security in terms of timing and contribution. Nations' different 
priorities on timing and contribution makes impossible the emergence of a continuous and 
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sufficient framework, which must include political and financial support, necessary for the 
creation of a UN standing maritime force. 
Without the commonly accepted framework of collective security, and the 
classification of threats to international peace within the UN Charter context; how can one 
limit and define that what is the boarder of national sovereignty and what is the border or 
dimension of collective action? And how can one prevent the exploitation of the differences 
and contradictions of the existing civilizations? 
Without establishing a framework which answers to these questions mentioned above; 
how can one define the UN naval missions and the context of these missions? And how can 
one provide and promote the multinational cooperation for collective security? Finally how 
can one define the authority in a UN naval operation and its limits? 
In the present atmosphere of the international relations, it is too hard to find adequate 
and complete answers to these questions. 
The third political problem stems from a common misperception about the UN's 
authority and responsibility. The UN's ability to act depends on the minimal consensus in 
the Security Council. According to Article 27 of the Charter: "Decisions of the Security 
Council ... shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring 
votes of the permanent members." In the absence of this consensus, the UN lacks authority 
to act, Without authority, how can an organization fulfill its responsibilities? The answer is 
'no way'. On the other hand, international peace comes from international stability which 
is engendered by the consensus between the major powers. In this sense, it can be said that 
the UN will never help to solve each international security problem, especially in a case 
which is inimical to any major power's interests. If the UN will not intervene each 
international security problem, is it feasible and reasonable to maintain a standing 
multinational maritime force within the UN organization? In such a case, sovereign states 
will probably be reluctant to contribute UN operations and to establish a UN standing 
multinational maritime force. 
The fourth political problem is today's debate over definitions, such as peacekeeping 
and peace enforcement, left over from the Cold War era. In essence, these were a kind of 
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formulation of the use of force according to the "rules" of the Cold War. In accordance with 
the UN Charter, if there is any military involvement or any economic measures determined 
by the Security Council, these means that Chapter VII is in process, not Chapter VI. In order 
to provide and promote international peace and security, Chapter VI just points what should 
be done firstly, not the use of force, but the pacific settlement of disputes. As a legacy of the 
Cold War, peacekeeping operations are determined under Chapter VI. This traditional 
peacekeeping perception - consent of disputing parties, light armament, and self defense -
causes the emergence of hesitations in terms of the assignment of national contingents 
because of the risky operation. If we must create a distinction between operations, such like 
peacekeeping and peace enforcement, this distinction should be done on the objectives, 
directives and procedures - a clear mandate - for each operation, but not on force size and 
composition or on the terms defined politically. Given the vital importance of Rules of 
Engagement in multinational maritime operations, a clear mandate must also include the 
determination and application of the ROEs. In the aftermath of the Cold War, most Western 
societies have begun to reduce the size of their military inventories. Consequently, their 
naval units have become more valuable for national requirements than they had in the past. 
In the absence of an adequate conceptual basis for UN maritime peace and security 
initiatives, and consequently without widely accepted and acknowledged ROEs, the member 
states of the UN will probably continue to be reluctant to assign their naval units to a UN 
standing multinational maritime force because nations do not want to put their valuable units 
at stake. 
The fifth source of political problems is the membership issue. Membership in the 
United Nations seeks for three fundamental features: being a peace-loving sovereign state, 
accepting the obligations of the Charter, and being able to carry out these obligations. If all 
of the members of the UN had to match this description, how many members could there be 
in the UN? All nations in the world are the members of the UN. It is well-known issue that 
even the supporters of international terrorism are still the members of the UN. If an 
organization is not able to protect its own respect by doing what its Charter says, how will 
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it provide international peace and security, and build confidence? This issue, to disregard its 
own principal rules, undermines the credibility and long-term legitimacy of the UN. 
The sixth political problem stems from the structure of the Security Council and the 
veto right of each permanent member. If we are now accepting the multi polarity as a 
prevailing system of international relations, the permanent part of the Security Council's 
structure must include the real major players of the multipolar order. Otherwise, the UN will 
be doomed to be inactive or ineffective like what it was in the Cold War era because of the 
relation between stability and peace. The real major players of the system are likely to seek 
for solutions by excluding the UN if one or some of them are not included among the 
permanent members or if any nation, which is not a major power, is a permanent member of 
the Security Council. 
The seventh political problem is the absence of the UN's capacity to manage collective 
security operations. The UN machinery has no experience in directing and conducting 
military operations and it does not have any conceptual basis for maritime peace and security 
issues .. This situation is another legacy of the Cold War. In terms of the collective maritime 
security, the conceptual basis has a vital importance for the creation of a UN standing 
multinational maritime force. Undoubtedly, it is implausible to establish such a standing 
maritime force before defining its possible missions and the limitations of these missions. 
As a result of this situation, the member states of the UN are reluctant to transfer control of 
their valuable naval forces and they prefer to establish ad hoc coalition force, if it is required, 
instead of standing force within the UN structure. 
The eighth political problem comes from the US' posture through the UN and NATO. 
The US, as a real major power, supports the both of these organizations in order to enhance 
its national interests. To the US, the UN is important because it gives legitimacy to the US 
activities including the use of force in the name of international peace and security or support 
for democratic movements. NATO is also important because it provides the opportunity to 
the US to engage in Europe and it reflects a powerful military structure under the US 
leadership. 
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The change in superpower relations has allowed the US to see the UN as an instrument 
of global foreign and security policy. It is an instrument to be used in dialogue. The UN is 
not a war fighting organization. It may just authorize the use of multinational military forces 
since the Security Council is the ultimate source of legitimacy for any multinational military 
operation. 
On the other hand, NATO is, simply, a military alliance in which the US has a major 
role in influencing its decisions and activities. And already, NATO is the most powerful 
regional organization in the world. If the ongoing process of the NATO expansion is 
achieved, it will become a kind of global organization. Moreover, with the commitments of 
new participants, NATO's military assets will become a kind of the world force. 
If a UN standing multinational maritime force were to be established, which countries 
contribute? Most probably, this creation will be realized by several countries which have 
already participated in the current operations. These countries are, generally, NATO 
members. In terms of the establishment a standing multinational maritime force, these states 
are likely to prefer NATO rather than the UN because of NATO's civilian and military 
structure involving administration, budgetary and planning staff. And they have already done 
it. It is unrealistic to expect from this countries to contribute to a second standing 
multinational maritime force. In this sense, it can be said that the UN will authorize, and then 
NATO will direct future operations. 
The establishment of a UN standing maritime force faces these main political problems 
which have been driven from the conflict between civilizations, the notion of nation-state, 
major power interests, differences in the use of force perceptions and NATO expansion. 
These roots of the existing political problems still continue and as a result of these situation, 
political support - and consequently political consensus - for collective security cited in the 
UN Charter has never been concluded. Notwithstanding the Western countries display their 
willingness for international maritime cooperation, a continuous and sufficient framework 
accepted by the world community has not been formed because of the absence of the political 
consensus. 
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The world is now living in a period of history that can be defined as transition to new 
world order. There are new players, new capabilities, new alignments, and new threats, but 
so far, no new rules. Consequently, the situation of uncertainty affects the international 
affairs. Under this conditions, the solution of existing political problems would not be 
achieved in the foreseeable future. As a historical evident, the creation such a force within 
the UN organization seem to be impossible unless these problems are solved. As a result of 
this picture, the establishment of a UN standing maritime force seems to be a dream 
foreseeable only in the distant future. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
This thesis states that the solution of existing political problems will not be achieved 
in the foreseeable future, but they are not unsolvable. Most of them are time-dependant 
problems, such as the conflict between civilizations, and differences in the concept of the use 
of force. Most likely, these problems will be automatically solved in the course of time. 
Indeed, it is implausible to wait for the solutions. The world community must do 
something rather than waiting until the humankind has suffered. In order to reduce the 
amount of unpleasant events or suffering conflicts, the solutions of problems may be 
quickened by the international or regional organizations, and major powers. 
In the future, the role of maritime activities will be crucial. It is inevitable to avoid 
from multinational maritime cooperation in the word which is covered by seas some 70 per 
cent of it. It is worthful to remind 1985 UN study: 
With greater interest in the exploitation of marine resources and the introduction 
of the exclusive economic zone, the number of offshore and other commercial 
activities will continue to increase ... [and] the growing complexity of offshore 
activities will call for much improved national and international management 
arrangements if marine resources are to be exploited in a rational and orderly 
manner to the benefit of mankind .... New resources, new developments, new 
responsibilities - all will demand more coordinated maritime policies, 
administrative machinery, and policing capabilities 
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The previous analysis of the possible UN maritime missions and multinational 
maritime force structures, and political problems that complicate the creation of a UN 
standing maritime force lead to nine recommendations. They present choices for decision 
makers regarding future UN activities in the maritime domain. 
1. The Bringing Article 47 to Life 
The permanent members must provide political support for full accomplishment of the 
Article 47. It is unrealistic to believe that a permanent member appears to fear that giving 
access to military decision-making to other permanent members would lead to indecision or 
may even be used to block UN operations or against itself, because the MSC is a advisory 
suborgan under the Security Council. 
a. The Military Staff Committee 
According to Article 47 (1) and (3), the Military Staff Committee is responsible 
to advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the military requirements 
for the maintenance of international peace and security, the employment and command of 
forces, the regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament, and it is also responsible, 
under the Security Council, for the strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the 
disposal of the Security Council. All of these responsibilities requires qualified officers' team 
which are well-trained, experienced, and well-equipped, and such a staff must include naval 
representation. 
This requirement is crucial in terms of the preparation of a clear mandate for any 
military operation and resolutions relating to the military sanctions. Moreover, it is important 
further resolutions of the Security Council in accordance with the operations' course of 
events. If the SC wants to make adequate decisions and take right resolutions, it must have 
a clear and complete strategical and tactical picture. Undoubtly, such a picture can be 
prepared by an effective and high capable MSC. Especially in maritime operations, these 
requirements have a vital role in terms of the providing clear mission objectives, the control 
of escalation- the political control of the maritime assets- and reducing risk -ROE. The 
permanent members which are responsible for the establishment of the MSC must assign 
their qualified personnel to the MSC and equip them with whatever they need. 
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permanent members which are responsible for the establishment of the MSC must assign 
their qualified personnel to the MSC and equip them with whatever they need. 
If it is established, a powerful MSC may serve for these objectives: 
• The resolutions taken timely and adequately are likely to increase in credibility 
of the Security Council, and the image of double standards is likely to be erased. 
• Fair and clear mandate or mandates prepared collectively are likely to increase in 
the contributions of the member states. 
• The works and experiences of the MSC are likely to form a continuous and 
adequate conceptual framework for collective security. 
• Rapid and appropriate response to the threats is likely to compel nations to solve 
their disputes with pacific settlements. 
b. The Utilizing Existing Regional Organizations 
According to the Article 47 (4), the MSC, with the authorization of the 
Security Council and after the consultation with appropriate regional agencies, may establish 
regional subcommittees. In this sense, as a beginning, the Security Council must realize a 
special agreement with NATO for the purpose of the creation of a Euro-Atlantic 
Subcommittee. 
Such a development will, most probably, serve for these objectives: 
• With a Euro-Atlantic Subcommittee, the advising and assisting capacity of the 
MSC will become an organ adequate to cope with many conflict in that region at 
a time. 
• Such a development will compel the members of other regional organizations or 
agencies to configure their own defense alliances in order to become a 
subcommittee ofthe MSC. 
If these two expectations works, they may provide these objectives: 
• It will moderate the relations between different civilizations, 
• It will weaken the strength of the notion ofNation-State, 
• It will satisfy the nations and strengthen the cooperative opinions in terms of the 
collective security. 
• It will realize the emergence of regional standing maritime forces as a part of their 
defense alliances such as NATO's standing naval forces. 
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and facilities in order to 'contribute' to the action taken by the Security Council. In the 
absence of Article 43 special agreements, the Security Council will be deprived of the 
authority to fulfill its main responsibility, Maybe, this situation was a rational choice during 
the Cold War period, but not now. 
From the view ofNation-State notion, such a development is unacceptable. Indeed, this 
is not a terrible issue, because special agreement means that the Security Council will accept 
and pay attention to the stipulations of a sovereign state. It does not mean that it is to lost the 
control of national contingents committed to the Security Council. 
The Security Council must realize Article 43 special agreements with its member states 
and regional organizations. For example, special agreements with the permanent members, 
NATO, and new major players, such as Germany and Japan, may engender an incitive and 
creative beginning. Such a development may serve for these objectives: 
• It will provide the application ofthe graduated pattern of collective security .122 
• It will weaken the belief of any major power hegemony under the name of the 
collective security, 
• It will prevent the abuse of the use of force. 
• It will compel the nations to contribute to the requirements necessary to the 
maintaining international peace and security in order to become who has a say, 
• It will prevent the possible rivalry between the UN and NATO in terms of who 
direct the collective military operation. 
• With utilizing from the NATO's experiences and its procedures, it will provide 
or help to establish an adequate doctrinal and procedural basis for the UN 
maritime operations. 
• It will provide available naval assets to the Security Council to show rapid 
reactions to each event which threaten or would threaten the international peace 
and security at the times of peace and crises. 
122 The graduated pattern of enforcement is set out in Chapter VII. The first step is a 
determination of a breach of the peace. (Article 39). The second step requires 
nonmilitary sanctions such as economic measures. (Article 41). The third step requires 
The Security Council to take actions by air, sea, and land forces. (Article 42). 
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3. The Reconstruction of the UN Security Council 
a. Permanent Members 
Again, as it defined in chapter one, Major Powers are sovereign states which are 
able, individually or by virtue of their strategic positions in powerful international or regional 
organizations, to affect international political outcomes regularly and substantially. In this 
sense, it is undeniable that Japan and Germany are new major powers in addition to the 
existing permanent members of the UN Security Council. Japan and Germany should be 
made permanent members. It is time for reorganization of the UN Security Council to bring 
it into keeping with contemporary realities. 
b. Non-Permanent Members 
Article 23 of the UN Charter provides that the General Assembly shall elect ten 
other Members of the United Nations to be non-permanent members of the Security Council, 
due regard being specially paid, in the first instance to the contribution of Members of the 
United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other 
purposes of the Organization, and also to equitable geographical distribution. The UN should 
define regions which are to be had their General Assembly as a sub-unit of the UN General 
Assembly. Each regional general assembly should elect its representative as a non-permanent 
member of the UN Security Council. This regions may be Europe, Central Asia, South Asia, 
Middle East, Latin America, Pacific, North Africa and South Africa. In this way, each 
region or each civilization can take its place in the collective security mechanism. 
4. Purposes and Principles 
The purposes and principles of the UN Charter represent the essential statement of the 
philosophy of the UN. In order to prevent nations' day-by-day interpretation of these norms, 
this philosophy requires to be supported by a complementary strategic concept which should 
be done by the Security Council with the approval of the General Assembly. Such a strategic 
concept may underline the need for collective security to take account of the global context. 
It may point out threat assessment and risks of a wider nature, including proliferation of 
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weapons of mass destruction, disruption of the flow of vital resources - especially resources 
of the seas - and act of terrorism, sabotage and piracy which can affect collective security 
interests. And, once it is created, the strategic concept of the UN should develop periodically 
in accordance with contemporary world requirements. 
5. Collective Security 
In the post-Cold War era, the struggle between civilizations and the notion of the 
Nation-State are main obstacles to the collective security. These issues have been exploited 
for years and they are still being exploited. The UN mechanism should define a conceptual 
framework which includes the definitions of collective security, international peace and 
security, and the classification of threats to international peace. Such a commonly accepted 
framework may not remove these problems, but at least it may provide a remarkable reduce 
in them. 
6. Authority and Responsibility 
This issue is one legacy ofthe Cold War competition. With the end ofthe Cold War, 
the UN' s ability to act still depends on more effective and creative cooperation among the 
major powers about the basis of international security, and the post-Cold War era provides 
a good environment for it. Such a cooperation may let the UN to be more effective. The 
major powers should do it. Otherwise, the absence of authority to act - in other words, the 
absence of the minimal consensus in the Security Council- will continue to be a disgraceful 
choice for the UN and collective security. 
7. Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement 
As pointed out in Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the right ofthe use of force is given 
to the Security Council with the exception of self-defense. In accordance with Article 51, 
even the self-defense has been limited until the Security Council has taken the measures 
necessary to maintain international peace and security. In this sense, the definition of and the 
classification of peace and security operations should be redefined under Chapter VII. The 
Security Council should leave the dance with traditional habits and it should use its authority 
provided by the Charter. 
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The establishment of a UN strategic concept, mentioned in the recommendation pertain 
to the Purposes and Principles, may indicate the essential direction for the redefinition of 
peace and security operations. Such a development may provide a clear and complete 
philosophy in order to prepare a conceptual framework for possible missions, procedures, 
doctrine, and ROEs. Moreover, a commonly accepted framework may remove or reduce 
remarkablely the leaders' unwillingness to invest their political future in risky, controversial 
international interventions with uncertain outcomes. 
8. Membership 
Procedures are provided in Article 4 for the membership to the UN. Procedures are also 
provided in Article 5 for the temporary suspension or expulsion of member states following 
recommendations of the Security Council and action by the General Assembly. It is 
historicall evident that Article 4 procedures have been concluded for every state, but Article 
5 procedures have never been concluded for any state. The UN, both of the Security Council 
and the General Assembly, should pay attention to the prerequisites of the membership. The 
supporters of international terrorism, such as Iran, Syria, and Libya, should not be allowed 
to keep their seats in the General Assembly. Additionally, the UN mechanism should provide 
procedures for temporary suspension or expulsion of any permanent member which violates 
the UN Charter. Such a development shows that at least, the UN is not a major powers' club. 
9. Decision-Making 
The third recommendation, the reconstruction of the UN Security Council, seeks for 
a solution which will provide wider political representation for the collective security. In 
addition to the reorganization of the Security Council, the voting process should be 
developed. 
For example, qualified majority approach may gain a new mean in which ten votes are 
required for approval, including affirmative votes or abstentions by all permanent members. 
The logic of this approach rests on two points. First, international stability requires a 
continuous and harmonious relations between the major powers. It means that each of them 
should have the veto right to prevent any decision which is inimical to its perception. 
Second, each region has normally three neighbor regions. If a conflict occurs within any 
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region, it is likely to affect three neighbor regions. In addition to seven votes of permanent 
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